| Open Access SQOUT
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Timing Mismatch Attack on Signal and Decoy States
The Timing Mismatch Attack exploits differences in emission timing between signal and decoy states generated by gain-switched laser diodes in QKD systems. This timing variation, arising from modulation of the laser’s pump current, allows the threat actor (Eve) to distinguish between signal and decoy states, enabling a more effective Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack.
Literature
| [Huang2018] | A. Huang, S. Sun, Z. Liu, and V. Makarov. "Decoy state quantum key distribution with imperfect source" In: Phys. Rev. A 98, 01233. (2018) 10.1103/ PhysRevA.98.012330. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 2
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Deploy external intensity modulator. |
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Consider this attack in your security proof, [Huang2018]. |