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Krelina2023a
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Michal Krelina
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The Prospect of Quantum Technologies in Space for Defence and Security
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2023
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Krelina2025
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Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks
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SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems
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2025
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Krenn2026
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Stephan Krenn, Omid Mir, Thomas Lorunser, Sebastian Ramacher, Florian Wohner
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Topology-Hiding Path Validation for Large-Scale Quantum Key Distribution Networks
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2026
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Krynski2023
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J. Krynski, N. Sultana, Y. S. Lee, V. Makarov, and T. Jennewein
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Protocols for Healing Radiation-Damaged Single-Photon Detectors Suitable for Space Environment
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2023
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Kumar2021
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Rupesh Kumar, Francesco Mazzoncini, Hao Qin, and Romain Alleaum
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Experimental Vulnerability Analysis of QKD Based on Attack Ratings
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2021
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Kumar2026
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Pankaj Kumar, Neel Kanth Kundu, Binayak Kar
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Quantum Key Distribution Networks Design: Overview and Challenges
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Journal Article
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2026
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Kuniyil2026
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Hashir Kuniyil, Asad Ali, Syed M. Arslan, Muhammad Talha Rahim, Artur Czerwinski, Saif Al Kuwari
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Recovery-Induced Erasure Attack on QKD Systems
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2026
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KunzJacques2015
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S. Kunz-Jacques and P. Jouguet
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Robust shot-noise measurement for continuous-variable quantum key distribution
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2015
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Kupferman2018
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J. Kupferman and S. Arnon
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Zero-error attacks on a quantum key distribution FSO system
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2018
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Kurochkin2024
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Y. Kurochkin, M. Papadovasilakis, A. Trushechkin, R. Piera, J. A. Grieve
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A practical transmitter device for passive state BB84 quantum key distribution
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2024
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Kurtsiefer2001
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C. Kurtsiefer, P. Zarda, S. Mayer, and H. Weinfurter
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The breakdown flash of silicon avalanche photodiodes-back door for eavesdropper attacks?
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2001
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LamasLinares2007
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A. Lamas-Linares and C. Kurtsiefer
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Breaking a quantum key distribution system through a timing side channel
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2007
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Lazzari2026
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C. De Lazzari, F. Stocco, E. Signorini, G. Fregona, F. Chirici, D. Giani
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Send the Key in Cleartext: Halving Key Consumption while Preserving Unconditional Security in QKD Authentication
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Preprint
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2026
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Lee2016
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M. Lee, B. Park, M. Woo, C. Park, Y. Kim, S. Han, and S. Moon
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Countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors with a background-noise-cancellation scheme
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2016
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Lee2017
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M. Lee, M. Woo, J. Jung, Y. Kim, S. Han, and S. Moon
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Free-space QKD system hacking by wavelength control using an external laser
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2017
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Lee2019
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M. Lee, M. Woo, Y. Kim, Y. Cho, S. Han, and S. Moon
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Quantum hacking on a free-space quantum key distribution system without measuring quantum signals
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2019
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Lee2019a
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Jianwei Lee, Lijiong Shen, Alessandro Cere, James Troupe, Antia Lamas-Linares, Christian Kurtsiefer
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Asymmetric delay attack on an entanglement-based bidirectional clock synchronization protocol
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2019
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Legre2012
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M. Legre and G. Ribordy
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Apparatus and method for the detection of attacks taking control of the single photon detectors of a quantum cryptography apparatus by randomly changing their efficiency
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2012
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Lenz2025
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J. N. Lenz, S. K. Perryman, D. J. Martynowych, D. A. Hopper, S. M. Oliver
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Hardware Trojan Detection Potential and Limits with the Quantum Diamond Microscope
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Journal Article
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2025
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Leverrier2008
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Anthony Leverrier, Romain Alléaume, Joseph Boutros, Gilles Zémor, and Philippe Grangier
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Multidimensional reconciliation for a continuous-variable quantum key distribution
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2008
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