Non-Kinetic Physical Attack
Parent:
A threat actor (Eve) damages or disrupts quantum-communication hardware at a distance and without physical contact, by delivering directed energy at it: a high-power laser or a high-power microwave beam. The target is the receiver (Bob) or the transmitter (Alice), either the optics and single-photon detector that terminate the quantum link or the supporting electronics of the quantum node, optical ground station, satellite or sensor that carries them [Krelina2023,Krelina2023a]. The classical analogue is a directed-energy weapon, and that analogy is the whole argument for the microwave arm: a quantum-communication satellite is an ordinary satellite carrying quantum-optical payloads, so the counterspace toolkit built for ordinary satellites applies to it unchanged [Krelina2023a]. The realised effect is denial or permanent destruction, and it does not recover when the attack stops.
This row covers the two upper bands of the laser-effect scale, permanent damage to the detector and thermal damage to the satellite bus, together with the microwave arm. The reversible band, in which bright light raises noise without damaging anything, is a separate technique, Quantum Channel Dazzling [A-0039]. Component damage delivered through a legitimate optical port in order to create a backdoor rather than an outage is Laser Damage Attack on Quantum Communication Systems [A-0058], and hands-on kinetic destruction of the same assets is Direct Physical Attack [A-0038]. Destroying a QKD node's physical entities defeats a mandatory protection requirement rather than merely being an unpleasant possibility [ITUX1713].
| [Bugge2014] | A. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov. "Laser Damage Helps the Eavesdropper in Quantum Cryptography" In: Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 070503. (2014) 10.1103/PhysRevLett.112.070503. |
| [ITUX1713] | ITU-T. "ITU-T X.1713: Security requirements for the protection of quantum key distribution nodes". (2024) https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1713-202404-I/en. |
| [Krelina2023] | M. Krelina. "Quantum Communication Countermeasures" (2023) 10.48550/arXiv.2310.08728. arXiv:2310.08728. |
| [Krelina2023a] | Michal Krelina. "The Prospect of Quantum Technologies in Space for Defence and Security" (2023) 10.1016/j.spacepol.2023.101563. |
| [Peng2024] | Q. Peng, B. Gao, K. Zaitsev, D. Wang, J. Ding, Y. Liu, Q. Liao, Y. Guo, A. Huang, and J. Wu. "Security boundaries of an optical power limiter for protecting quantum key distribution systems" (2024) 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.21.014026. arXiv:2303.12355. |
| [Zhang2021] | G. Zhang, I. W. Primaatmaja, J. Y. Haw, X. Gong, C. Wang, and C. C. W. Lim. "Securing Practical Quantum Communication Systems with Optical Power Limiters" (2021) 10.1103/PRXQuantum.2.030304. https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PRXQuantum.2.030304. |
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- Quantum Communication
- Quantum Sensing & Imaging & Metrology
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Scoped deliberately to one rung of the effect ladder. The destructive rungs announce themselves, since a detector at complete insensitivity stops counting and a satellite in complete failure stops responding [Krelina2023]. The rung worth monitoring for is the intermediate one, where high-power light leaves the avalanche photodiode permanently blinded [Krelina2023]. The detector then stops counting single photons but can still be controlled with bright light [Bugge2014]. That is exactly what this control assesses components for, and it is the same rung that gives this technique its degradation attack type. |
CM-0012 Continuous Device Functionality Monitoring |
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Design hardening of the whole installation, at family level. CM-0030 covers the optimal design of QKD nodes, optical ground stations and communication satellites, which is the family the primary's counter-countermeasure list sits in: telescope design that minimises scattering surfaces with internal baffling, satellite architecture engineered to minimise light reflection and scattering with materials such as anti-reflective coatings, and a smaller collecting telescope acting as a spatial filter [Krelina2023]. It is also where the hardening half of the hardening-and-resilience pair belongs, increasing the hardiness of satellites [Krelina2023a]. Two scope notes, because this edge sits next to three others that could be mistaken for it. The specific measures live on the family's children, the receiver-side ones on CM-0028 and the platform-side ones on CM-0029, both of which this entity also links; this edge is the family-level statement. And CM-0030's TEMPEST content points outward, at electromagnetic espionage reading the key out of detector emissions, whereas the inbound electromagnetic immunity this technique's microwave arm needs is carried by CM-0075 [ITUX1713]. The two edges are complementary rather than duplicates. Effectiveness is low and the residual high because design hardening raises the power an attacker has to deliver and removes no route. The destructive route arrives on the signal's own axis, since any strong attack that destroys a detector must be directed into the target's field of view, so scatter reduction and baffling have nothing to act on there [Krelina2023]. |
CM-0030 Quantum Device Optimal Design and TEMPEST |
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The only control on this row that answers what this technique actually produces, a node or endpoint permanently out of service, rather than trying to stop the energy arriving. The primary names it among its counter-countermeasures: a natural mitigation strategy involves switching to backup Quantum Key Distribution links or rerouting the quantum connection [Krelina2023]. It frames the problem by contrast with classical networks, whose crucial advantage is the ability to reroute traffic when a line or node is severed, typically without major consequences [Krelina2023]. |
CM-0085 Quantum Network Traffic Rerouting |
| From parent: Destruction | |
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Continuous device functionality monitoring answers one specific case in this family and not its main one, and the scope matters because overstating it would credit the control with stopping an outage it cannot stop. The main case needs no monitor: a cut span, a melted detector and a module in an error state all announce themselves. What monitoring buys is the case Bugge2014 names, where the threat actor "could for instance wait for a power outage, and perform the damage when the system is unpowered" [Bugge2014], so a system can come back up damaged and be trusted anyway unless it is re-characterised before service resumes. Monitoring characteristics during operation rather than only at installation is that paper's own recommendation. That is one case out of several, and the control's main benefit, catching characterisation drift on a device that keeps running, belongs to the A-0058 branch rather than to this family. |
CM-0012 Continuous Device Functionality Monitoring |
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Rerouting answers the consequence rather than the act, and it is one of the two controls on this parent that reach all three children, the other being its alternative CM-0151: a cut span, a destroyed node and a bricked module all leave the same question of where the traffic goes. Krelina2023 names the control directly, since "A natural mitigation strategy involves switching to backup Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) links or rerouting the quantum connection" [Krelina2023]. What makes it expensive here is that the quantum case cannot borrow the classical one, where there is "the ability to reroute traffic in the event of a line or node being severed, typically without major consequences" [Krelina2023], and the cost of not having it scales with sparseness, since "the risk of space-born quantum communication denial is higher with lower deployment" [Krelina2023a]. For this family the spare that matters is the spare module or node rather than the spare route, because a second terminal on a destroyed span, or in a destroyed building, shares the fate of the first. |
CM-0085 Quantum Network Traffic Rerouting |
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
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Electronics and analog components, as a knock-on for the laser arm and as the whole of the electromagnetic arm. On a satellite the very-high-energy band's targets are electrical and thermal rather than optical, namely the thermal regulation system, batteries, solar panels and attitude control [Krelina2023]. On a terrestrial node the electromagnetic arm reaches the supporting electronics directly, and the standard names applying external forces such as electromagnetic waves as a threat to a QKD node [ITUX1713]. |
L2 — Electronics & Analog Components | Secondary Effect |
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The physical layer, quantum and optical, and the primary target. Two properties of this layer are what make the attack work. First, the receiver accepts whatever in-band light arrives from inside its field of view, a cone running from about 3 µrad to around 500 µrad, and any attack strong enough to destroy the single-photon detector must be delivered into that cone [Krelina2023]. Second, the optics between the aperture and the detector, the bandpass filters, beam splitters and polarising beam splitters, only attenuate the arriving power rather than bounding it, so there is no element in the path whose job is to stop it [Krelina2023]. What the delivered power then does at this layer is graded and permanent. At W the avalanche photodiode is permanently blinded with lower sensitivity; at W it suffers structural damage and becomes completely insensitive; above that the rest of the receive path follows, with the polarisation spatial filter degrading at W and optical glass melting at W/cm² [Krelina2023]. The detector is the first to fail because it is identified as the most susceptible target in a quantum-communication node [Krelina2023]. The electronics-layer half of this technique, covering the satellite bus and the electromagnetic arm, is recorded on a separate L2 mapping with impact type secondary. |
L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) | Primary Target |
| From parent: Destruction | ||
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System Control and Orchestration, a secondary target of this family. The governing Recommendation enumerates the node's physical entities that boundary protection must cover, and the QKDN controller and the QKDN manager are among them, so destroying a site takes the control plane with it [ITUX1713]. The same clause states the active case, that "Attackers can also interrupt, influence and even take control of the operations of QKDN physical entities and their interfaces" [ITUX1713], which is also the plane child A-0128 crosses to reach the firmware or calibration store. Secondary rather than primary because no child targets the control plane for its own sake: A-0038 destroys it as part of a site, and A-0128 passes through it. |
L4 — System Control & Orchestration | Secondary Effect |
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Post-Processing and Cryptographic, covering key management, a secondary target. The key manager is one of the node's enumerated physical entities that boundary protection must cover, so a destroyed site destroys key management along with the optics [ITUX1713]. This layer is why the loss matters beyond the one link: "a partially corrupted QKD node can lead to failures of the security of keys relayed using a corrupted QKD node where no honest path exists" [ITUX1713], so on a trusted-relay chain the loss of one site reaches traffic that never passed through it. Secondary because no child attacks key management as its objective; the layer is lost with the asset that holds it. |
L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic | Secondary Effect |
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Firmware and Software Drivers, the primary target of child A-0128, which reaches this layer over the node's management or maintenance interface and overwrites the firmware image or the calibration store [ITUX1713]. On a module built to specification the corruption does not produce corrupted operation. The module fails its power-up software integrity test, enters an error state, and "shall not perform any cryptographic operations or output data via the data output interface while in an error state" [ETSI008], so the effect is a total stoppage rather than a degradation. The effect is also recoverable rather than irreversible, because the same specification enumerates the ways out: "this may include maintenance of the module, re-powering the module, automatic module recovery, or returning the module to the vendor for servicing" [ETSI008]. It still belongs to this family because the module stays down until an operator acts, which is the family test rather than whether hardware was destroyed. |
L3 — Firmware & Software Drivers | Primary Target |
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Physical Layer (Quantum and Optical), the primary target of this family and the only layer where its destruction has actually been measured. High-power laser illumination and optical or component sabotage permanently damage detectors and spatial filters [Bugge2014,Makarov2016]: the detector at the end of the optical path is blinded permanently between 1.2 and 1.7 W, where "the laser damage blinding is permanent and does not require continuing illumination", and at 2 W and above it is an open circuit, because "the bonding wires melted off, leaving the device an open circuit" [Bugge2014]; in a commercial fibre system the damaged component was the detector that monitors incoming light against Trojan-horse attacks [Makarov2016]. Two further routes reach the same layer without any illumination at all, and they are most of child A-0038. A span of installed fibre is cut out or pulled, which needs only "prior knowledge of the location of the optic fibres or quantum nodes for a successful execution" [Krelina2023]. And a transmitter or receiver module is smashed or carried away inside a node, whose physical entities the governing Recommendation enumerates and requires to be protected against interruption [ITUX1713]. One qualification on permanence: the catalogue's own annealing recovery control CM-0122 is scoped to elevated dark counts and explicitly not to the destructive bands, so the bands this family occupies are the ones recovery cannot reach. |
L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) | Primary Target |
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Electronics and Analog Components, a secondary target of this family, reached two ways. Child A-0038 wrecks the power and cooling a site runs on, which takes the analog and electronic subsystems with the site. Child A-0037's microwave arm induces voltages and currents in the node's supporting electronics directly, without passing through the optics, and that arm is in scope only by the argument that "a satellite for quantum communication is a usual satellite with quantum-optical and optical payloads" so the classical counterspace toolkit applies to it unchanged [Krelina2023a]. The only normative hook for it is a threat listing rather than a requirement, that classical side-channel attacks "typically involve detecting some outputs from the modules (e.g., power consumption, radiative electromagnetic (EM) signals, etc.) or applying external forces (EM waves, control of temperature, voltage, etc.)" [ITUX1713]. There is no immunity figure to hold a module to. The module security specification mandates environmental failure protection for temperature and voltage only, and its enumerated list of the magnitudes an evaluator must control runs to "darkness (when required), temperature, voltage, pressure, humidity, atmospheric chemical composition, mechanical vibrations and the presence of nuclear and any other ionizing radiation" with no electromagnetic field in it at all [ETSI008]. Thermal overloading is the other mechanism recorded against this layer. |
L2 — Electronics & Analog Components | Secondary Effect |
| Relation type | Description | Technique |
|---|---|---|
| Alternative to |
Same weapon, different power band, opposite persistence. The three-band effect model separates dazzling, which is considered more as a countermeasure than a weapon because it has no permanent effect, from blinding, where the damage is permanent [Krelina2023]. A-0039 owns the first band and this row owns the second and third. The boundary is not reliably controllable, since the threshold between dazzling and blinding is almost impossible to predict, so an operator or attacker raising power for a reversible purpose can cross into this row by accident [Krelina2023]. |
A-0039 Quantum Channel Dazzling |
| From parent: Destruction | ||
| Alternative to |
Denial (A-0047) is the sibling family in the same tactic and produces the same immediate picture, a link that makes no key. The two are told apart by what happens next: a Denial route ends when the attack ends and the service returns by itself, while a Destruction route leaves damage that outlasts the threat actor, so the service returns only when the operator repairs, replaces or restores something. The relation is recorded as an alternative because a threat actor who wants an outage can choose either family, but the sources describe a continuum rather than two clean options, and the crossing cannot be predicted from either side: "the threshold between dazzling and blinding is almost impossible to predict" [Krelina2023], and for a damage attempt the outcome "is thus impossible to predict prior to testing" [Makarov2016]. An operator should therefore treat a Denial event at the top of its power band as a possible Destruction event until the hardware has been re-characterised. |
A-0047 Denial |
| Relation type | Description | Technique |
|---|---|---|
| Alternative to |
A-0037 Non-Kinetic Physical Attack reaches the same outcome, a destroyed or disabled asset, by directed energy at a distance: high-power laser or high-power microwave, with no physical contact. The two rows split the destruction family by delivery rather than by effect, which is why this technique's physical_access_required is direct_contact and A-0037's is not. [Krelina2023] lists both in one breath as ways a quantum-communication asset can be destroyed, and quantifies the laser case against a satellite bus at around and higher than 10,000 J, for example 2 kW impinging for 5 seconds. A reader arriving at either row should be able to tell which side of the line their case falls on. |
A-0038 Direct Physical Attack |
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