Acquired Key Abusing
Acquired Key Abusing covers the adversary's actions on objectives once a QKD-derived key has been recovered — in full, or completed from raw/partial material via Adversary Post-Processing (A-0040) and Partial Raw-Key Acquiring (A-0110). With the key in hand the link's confidentiality and authentication guarantees no longer hold, and Eve can decrypt, forge, or impersonate over the protected channel.
| [Barker2020] | Elaine Barker. "Recommendation for Key Management, Part 1 General (NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Revision 5)" (2020) 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5. |
| [ETSI014] | ETSI. "ETSI GS QKD 014 V1.1.1: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Protocol and data format of REST-based key delivery API". (2019) https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/QKD/001_099/014/01.01.01_60/gs_QKD014v010101p.pdf. |
| [ETSI016PP] | ETSI. "Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Common Criteria Protection Profile - Pair of Prepare and Measure Quantum Key Distribution Modules". In: ETSI GS QKD 016. (2024) https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/QKD/001_099/016/02.01.01_60/gs_QKD016v020101p.pdf. |
| [Rufino2026] | Matheus Rufino, Rafael Duarte Marcelino, Julio Smanioto Garcia. "A Formal Basis for Quantum Cryptographic Exposure Measurement under HNDL Threat". (2026) arXiv:2605.22569. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.22569. |
c3a43f8f-43ee-4926-9112-136683a7f2ad
- Quantum Communication
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
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Layer 5 is the primary target because the technique operates on the post-processed key itself, after distillation and after delivery, which is the same reading that puts its leakage stage and its targeted protocol stage at post-processing. NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 places the compromised-key state and the revocation duty in exactly this key-management layer: a key is compromised when it is "provided to or determined by an unauthorized entity", and on that trigger "the key or key pair shall be revoked" [Barker2020]. The layer above carries the visible damage; this one carries the mechanism. |
L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic | Primary Target |
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Layer 6 carries the visible effect rather than the mechanism. Decrypted application payloads and forged authenticated messages surface at the application and protocol layer, one step above the key-management layer where the key is actually abused, which is why this mapping is secondary. The damage is measured here too: Rufino2026 bounds the payoff by the adversarial shelf life, "how long the captured ciphertext retains strategic value after harvest" [Rufino2026], and that value belongs to the application data, not to the key. |
L6 — Application & Protocol Layer | Secondary Effect |
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Operational security is the layer that fails on the custody route into this technique, where a delivered key is lost through penetration or subversion of the system holding it rather than through an attack on the quantum layer. ETSI GS QKD 016 assigns handling of an already-compromised key to the operational-environment objective OE.SecureOp, which requires that on loss of physical assurance every QKD key created since assurance was last held be treated as compromised [ETSI016PP], and NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 notes that adversaries obtain keys through "the penetration or subversion of a system" more cheaply than by attacking the algorithm [Barker2020]. Marked prerequisite rather than primary because the technique does not attack operational security, it presupposes that custody of the key has already failed. It is not the only route, since Adversary Post-Processing (A-0040) and Partial Raw-Key Acquiring (A-0110) can hand over the key with no operational-security failure at all, which is why the confidence on this mapping is moderate rather than high. |
L7 — Operational Security | Prerequisite for Attack |
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