Direct Physical Attack
Parent:
A threat actor (Eve) physically destroys the equipment that carries a quantum-communication service: cutting the optical fibre or pulling out a span of it, smashing or carrying away a transmitter or receiver module, setting off a charge at a node or an optical ground station, or wrecking the power and cooling that keep a site running. The threat actor has to reach the asset and touch it, and has to know where it is first, but nothing beyond that is needed. Once the location of the fibres or the quantum nodes is known, a simple interruption suffices [Krelina2023].
Nothing is read and no key is stolen. The service stops and stays stopped until the fibre is spliced or re-laid or the equipment is replaced. A fibre cut belongs here because it needs such a repair: the published SQOUT framework gives cutting optical fibres as an example of physical destruction, and severing an exposed fibre as the example of its lowest threat band [Krelina2025]. Interruptions that end once the threat actor removes them, such as a fibre bend or a blocked free-space path, are A-0118. How much that costs depends on the network rather than on the act: a dense classical network absorbs the loss of several nodes by rerouting the traffic, and a low-density quantum network cannot [Krelina2023a]. A standards body treats the exposure as a control the operator was supposed to have rather than as bad luck, because a QKD node is required to provide boundary protection against physical intrusion and to protect against interruption of its physical entities [ITUX1713].
| [Gaidash2022a] | Andrei Gaidash, George Miroshnichenko, Anton Kozubov. "Quantum network security dependent on connection density between trusted nodes" (2022) 10.48550/arXiv.2202.09162. |
| [ITUX1713] | ITU-T. "ITU-T X.1713: Security requirements for the protection of quantum key distribution nodes". (2024) https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1713-202404-I/en. |
| [Krelina2023] | M. Krelina. "Quantum Communication Countermeasures" (2023) 10.48550/arXiv.2310.08728. arXiv:2310.08728. |
| [Krelina2023a] | Michal Krelina. "The Prospect of Quantum Technologies in Space for Defence and Security" (2023) 10.1016/j.spacepol.2023.101563. |
| [Krelina2025] | Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. |
| [Lloyd2026] | Zachary Lloyd, Mengjun Xie. "Risk Assessment of a Hypothetical Quantum Repeater Network Using SP 800-30 and the CIA Triad" (2026) 10.1145/3746467.3801533. |
4476a898-db71-4cfe-9ee6-bcc29fa41868
- Quantum Communication
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Rerouting is the mitigation [Krelina2023] names first for this family: a natural mitigation strategy involves switching to backup Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) links or rerouting the quantum connection. It restores the service on another path and leaves the destroyed asset destroyed, which is the difference between this control on A-0038 and on the reversible sibling A-0118, where the link returns once the interruption is removed. The same paper states the limit in the same breath, that rerouting can be particularly challenging in the early stages of quantum networks where redundancy is minimal and consumes substantial resources, and gives the satellite case concretely: a free-space link using a satellite as a trusted repeater would need rerouting via a terrestrial quantum network whose repeater nodes are typically spaced approximately 100 km apart. [Gaidash2022a] says how much route redundancy buys and what it costs. The path breaks only when nodes in a row are lost, because with consecutive nodes gone no route between the first and the last node can be constructed, so on a serial chain at a single destroyed node ends the service. Reading the mean per-node failure probability into the same expression gives the probability that no working route connects the endpoints, that is the overall denial-of-service probability , which falls as the -th power as density rises. The price is times the nodes per maximum allowed distance and QKD links instead of . This is also what identifies the right kind of redundancy for this technique: route and node, not a spare device at the same site, which shares the fate of the first. |
CM-0085 Quantum Network Traffic Rerouting |
| From parent: Destruction | |
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Continuous device functionality monitoring answers one specific case in this family and not its main one, and the scope matters because overstating it would credit the control with stopping an outage it cannot stop. The main case needs no monitor: a cut span, a melted detector and a module in an error state all announce themselves. What monitoring buys is the case Bugge2014 names, where the threat actor "could for instance wait for a power outage, and perform the damage when the system is unpowered" [Bugge2014], so a system can come back up damaged and be trusted anyway unless it is re-characterised before service resumes. Monitoring characteristics during operation rather than only at installation is that paper's own recommendation. That is one case out of several, and the control's main benefit, catching characterisation drift on a device that keeps running, belongs to the A-0058 branch rather than to this family. |
CM-0012 Continuous Device Functionality Monitoring |
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Rerouting answers the consequence rather than the act, and it is one of the two controls on this parent that reach all three children, the other being its alternative CM-0151: a cut span, a destroyed node and a bricked module all leave the same question of where the traffic goes. Krelina2023 names the control directly, since "A natural mitigation strategy involves switching to backup Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) links or rerouting the quantum connection" [Krelina2023]. What makes it expensive here is that the quantum case cannot borrow the classical one, where there is "the ability to reroute traffic in the event of a line or node being severed, typically without major consequences" [Krelina2023], and the cost of not having it scales with sparseness, since "the risk of space-born quantum communication denial is higher with lower deployment" [Krelina2023a]. For this family the spare that matters is the spare module or node rather than the spare route, because a second terminal on a destroyed span, or in a destroyed building, shares the fate of the first. |
CM-0085 Quantum Network Traffic Rerouting |
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
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Electronics and analog components are the secondary target of the infrastructure route: wrecking the power and cooling that keep a node running destroys the analog and electronic subsystems downstream of the optics without touching the optics themselves, and the same site charge takes both. [ITUX1713] clause 8.1 a) covers the outcome normatively, stating that an intruder can interrupt, influence and even take control of the operations of QKDN physical entities and their interfaces. Mapped secondary rather than primary because the physical and optical layer is where the act lands first on every route, and confidence is moderate because no source separates the electronics from the rest of the destroyed asset. |
L2 — Electronics & Analog Components | Secondary Effect |
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Operational security is the layer the threat actor must get past before any physical layer is reachable at all, which is why this mapping is a prerequisite rather than an effect. Two controls live there and both are named in the sources. Physical protection of the site, the route and its conduits, which [ITUX1713] requires as an outcome in SReq.1 and SReq.3 while only recommending the means in SReq.2. And route and site location secrecy, which [Krelina2023] calls imperative, on the reasoning that knowledge of the locations of fibre optic cables, ground optical stations or the trajectories of quantum satellites is crucial for a successful attack. Where both hold, the attack does not start. |
L7 — Operational Security | Prerequisite for Attack |
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The physical and optical layer is where the medium, the optics and the terminal hardware live, and this technique destroys them, so it is the primary target on every route: the fibre span, the transmitter or receiver module, and the node or optical ground station that holds them. [ITUX1713] clause 7 defines the assets concerned as the QKD node's physical entities, namely the QKD module, the key manager and the QKDN controller, together with the links between them, and clause 8.1 a) states that an intruder can interrupt, influence and even take control of the operations of those entities. [Krelina2023] gives the span case in its own words, that once the route location is known a simple fibre interruption suffices. Every layer above loses its input as a consequence rather than as a separate effect. That is why the electronics and analog layer is mapped secondary, for the power-and-cooling sabotage route, and operational security is mapped as the prerequisite the threat actor must defeat first, instead of every layer being mapped primary. |
L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) | Primary Target |
| From parent: Destruction | ||
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System Control and Orchestration, a secondary target of this family. The governing Recommendation enumerates the node's physical entities that boundary protection must cover, and the QKDN controller and the QKDN manager are among them, so destroying a site takes the control plane with it [ITUX1713]. The same clause states the active case, that "Attackers can also interrupt, influence and even take control of the operations of QKDN physical entities and their interfaces" [ITUX1713], which is also the plane child A-0128 crosses to reach the firmware or calibration store. Secondary rather than primary because no child targets the control plane for its own sake: A-0038 destroys it as part of a site, and A-0128 passes through it. |
L4 — System Control & Orchestration | Secondary Effect |
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Post-Processing and Cryptographic, covering key management, a secondary target. The key manager is one of the node's enumerated physical entities that boundary protection must cover, so a destroyed site destroys key management along with the optics [ITUX1713]. This layer is why the loss matters beyond the one link: "a partially corrupted QKD node can lead to failures of the security of keys relayed using a corrupted QKD node where no honest path exists" [ITUX1713], so on a trusted-relay chain the loss of one site reaches traffic that never passed through it. Secondary because no child attacks key management as its objective; the layer is lost with the asset that holds it. |
L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic | Secondary Effect |
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Firmware and Software Drivers, the primary target of child A-0128, which reaches this layer over the node's management or maintenance interface and overwrites the firmware image or the calibration store [ITUX1713]. On a module built to specification the corruption does not produce corrupted operation. The module fails its power-up software integrity test, enters an error state, and "shall not perform any cryptographic operations or output data via the data output interface while in an error state" [ETSI008], so the effect is a total stoppage rather than a degradation. The effect is also recoverable rather than irreversible, because the same specification enumerates the ways out: "this may include maintenance of the module, re-powering the module, automatic module recovery, or returning the module to the vendor for servicing" [ETSI008]. It still belongs to this family because the module stays down until an operator acts, which is the family test rather than whether hardware was destroyed. |
L3 — Firmware & Software Drivers | Primary Target |
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Physical Layer (Quantum and Optical), the primary target of this family and the only layer where its destruction has actually been measured. High-power laser illumination and optical or component sabotage permanently damage detectors and spatial filters [Bugge2014,Makarov2016]: the detector at the end of the optical path is blinded permanently between 1.2 and 1.7 W, where "the laser damage blinding is permanent and does not require continuing illumination", and at 2 W and above it is an open circuit, because "the bonding wires melted off, leaving the device an open circuit" [Bugge2014]; in a commercial fibre system the damaged component was the detector that monitors incoming light against Trojan-horse attacks [Makarov2016]. Two further routes reach the same layer without any illumination at all, and they are most of child A-0038. A span of installed fibre is cut out or pulled, which needs only "prior knowledge of the location of the optic fibres or quantum nodes for a successful execution" [Krelina2023]. And a transmitter or receiver module is smashed or carried away inside a node, whose physical entities the governing Recommendation enumerates and requires to be protected against interruption [ITUX1713]. One qualification on permanence: the catalogue's own annealing recovery control CM-0122 is scoped to elevated dark counts and explicitly not to the destructive bands, so the bands this family occupies are the ones recovery cannot reach. |
L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) | Primary Target |
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Electronics and Analog Components, a secondary target of this family, reached two ways. Child A-0038 wrecks the power and cooling a site runs on, which takes the analog and electronic subsystems with the site. Child A-0037's microwave arm induces voltages and currents in the node's supporting electronics directly, without passing through the optics, and that arm is in scope only by the argument that "a satellite for quantum communication is a usual satellite with quantum-optical and optical payloads" so the classical counterspace toolkit applies to it unchanged [Krelina2023a]. The only normative hook for it is a threat listing rather than a requirement, that classical side-channel attacks "typically involve detecting some outputs from the modules (e.g., power consumption, radiative electromagnetic (EM) signals, etc.) or applying external forces (EM waves, control of temperature, voltage, etc.)" [ITUX1713]. There is no immunity figure to hold a module to. The module security specification mandates environmental failure protection for temperature and voltage only, and its enumerated list of the magnitudes an evaluator must control runs to "darkness (when required), temperature, voltage, pressure, humidity, atmospheric chemical composition, mechanical vibrations and the presence of nuclear and any other ionizing radiation" with no electromagnetic field in it at all [ETSI008]. Thermal overloading is the other mechanism recorded against this layer. |
L2 — Electronics & Analog Components | Secondary Effect |
| Relation type | Description | Technique |
|---|---|---|
| Alternative to |
A-0037 Non-Kinetic Physical Attack reaches the same outcome, a destroyed or disabled asset, by directed energy at a distance: high-power laser or high-power microwave, with no physical contact. The two rows split the destruction family by delivery rather than by effect, which is why this technique's physical_access_required is direct_contact and A-0037's is not. [Krelina2023] lists both in one breath as ways a quantum-communication asset can be destroyed, and quantifies the laser case against a satellite bus at around and higher than 10,000 J, for example 2 kW impinging for 5 seconds. A reader arriving at either row should be able to tell which side of the line their case falls on. |
A-0037 Non-Kinetic Physical Attack |
| From parent: Destruction | ||
| Alternative to |
Denial (A-0047) is the sibling family in the same tactic and produces the same immediate picture, a link that makes no key. The two are told apart by what happens next: a Denial route ends when the attack ends and the service returns by itself, while a Destruction route leaves damage that outlasts the threat actor, so the service returns only when the operator repairs, replaces or restores something. The relation is recorded as an alternative because a threat actor who wants an outage can choose either family, but the sources describe a continuum rather than two clean options, and the crossing cannot be predicted from either side: "the threshold between dazzling and blinding is almost impossible to predict" [Krelina2023], and for a damage attempt the outcome "is thus impossible to predict prior to testing" [Makarov2016]. An operator should therefore treat a Denial event at the top of its power band as a possible Destruction event until the hardware has been re-characterised. |
A-0047 Denial |
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