| Open Access SQOUTLaser Seeding Attack (LSA)
The Laser Seeding Attack (LSA) involves manipulating the intensity of the light emitted by a laser diode in a QKD system's transmitter (Alice) by injecting continuous-wave (CW) laser light at a specific wavelength. This injection stimulates the emission, boosting the transmitter's output power and altering the characteristics of the emitted pulses, thereby compromising the security of QKD protocols by enabling attackers to gain knowledge of the light's phase and potentially opening doors for further quantum attacks.
Literature
| [Huang2019] | A. Huang, A. Navarrete, S.-H. Sun, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Curty, and V. Makarov. "Laser-Seeding Attack in Quantum Key Distribution" In: Phys. Rev. Applied 12, 064043. (2019) 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.12.064043. |
| [Lovic2023] | V. Lovic, D. G. Marangon, P. R. Smith, R. I. Woodward, and A. J. Shields. "Quantified effects of the laser-seeding attack in quantum key distribution" In: Phys. Rev. Appl., vol. 20, no. 4, p. 044005. (2023) 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.20.044005. |
| [Sun2015] | S.-H. Sun, F. Xu, M.-S. Jiang, X.-C. Ma, H.-K. Lo, and L.-M. Liang. "Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography" In: Phys. Rev. A, vol. 92, no. 2, p. 022304. (2015) 10.1103/PhysRevA.92.022304. |
| [Zheng2019] | Y. Zheng, P. Huang, A. Huang, J. Peng, and G. Zeng. "Security analysis of practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems under laser seeding attack" In: Opt. Express 27, 27369-27384. (2019) 10.1364/OE.27.027369. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 3
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Employment of optical isolator - be aware of finite isolation, can be insufficient [Huang2019]. Moreover, optical isolators can be manipulated using additional attacks. |
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Employing a watchdog monitor can be beneficial, but it can also be attacked—damaged [Huang2019] or blinded [Lovic2023]. |
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Employment of true single photon source. |