Detector Control via After-Gate Pulses Attack
The Detector Control via After-Gate Pulses Attack targets the transient operational state of gated Avalanche Photodiodes (APDs) used in DV-QKD systems. By sending bright, fake-state pulses immediately after the APDs' gating window, when the APDs switch from Geiger to linear mode, the threat actor (Eve) can manipulate detection outcomes to control the key generation process without detection errors unless afterpulsing exposes the attack.
| [Gerhardt2011a] | I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, V. Scarani, V. Makarov, and C. Kurtsiefer. "Experimentally Faking the Violation of Bells Inequalities" In: Phys. Rev. Lett. 107, 170404. (2011) 10.1103/PhysRevLett.107.170404. |
| [Jain2016] | N. Jain and G. Kanter. "Upconversion-based receivers for quantum hacking-resistant quantum key distribution" In: Quantum Inf Process 15, 2863–2879. (2016) 10.1007/s11128-016-1315-y. |
| [KoehlerSidki2019] | A. Koehler-Sidki, J. Dynes, A. Martinez, M. Lucamarini, G. Roberts, A. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. Shields. "Intrinsic Mitigation of the After-Gate Attack in Quantum Key Distribution through Fast-Gated Delayed Detection" In: Phys. Rev. Applied 12, 024050. (2019) 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.12.024050. |
| [Lydersen2011b] | L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, . Mary, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs. "Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography" In: Phys. Rev. A 84, 032320. (2011) 10.1103/PhysRevA.84.032320. |
| [Silva2012] | T. F. da Silva, G. B. Xavier, G. P. Temporão, and J. P. von der Weid. "Real-time monitoring of single-photon detectors against eavesdropping in quantum key distribution systems" In: Opt. Express 20, 18911-18924. (2012) 10.1364/OE.20.018911. |
| [Wiechers2011] | C. Wiechers, L. Lydersen, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs. "After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem" In: New Journal of Physics 13, 013043. (2011) 10.1088/1367-2630/13/1/013043. |
| [Ye2020] | M. Ye, J. Li, Y. Wang, P. Gao, X. Lu, and Y. Qian. "Quantum key distribution system against the probabilistic faint after-gate attack" In: Commun. Theor. Phys. 72 115102. (2022) 10.1088/1572-9494/abb7d8. |
cf27f399-e54c-4542-8aaf-5d31523aac0b
- Quantum Communication
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Wiechers2011 §7 proposes a watchdog detector placed at Bob's input to detect bright faked states; because such a detector cannot itself be an avalanche detector (which could then be hacked the same way), the countermeasure is only effective against bright faked-state variants [Wiechers2011]. |
CM-0011 Watchdog Detector |
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Randomising the detection efficiency denies a threat actor deterministic click control. [Silva2012] proposes changing a physical parameter of the detector, such as efficiency or dead time, from time to time at random; Eve cannot follow the change, so Alice and Bob can become suspicious of an attack. |
CM-0021 Random Detection Efficiency Changing of APD |
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Bit-mapped gating changes the gate-timing scheme itself, which bears on closing the after-gate linear-mode and dead-time transient windows this technique exploits. [Lydersen2011b] names bit-mapped gating against the faint gate-edge variant: it randomises the detection events outside the centre of the gate. |
CM-0039 Bit-Mapped Gating |
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Upconversion detectors shift single-photon detection into a different physical regime than the gated-APD linear-mode/dead-time transient this technique exploits, removing the exploitable window by detector-technology substitution. [Jain2016] proposes such a receiver and notes that its free-running detectors preclude attacks after the gate. |
CM-0024 Signal Upconversion |
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Wiechers2011's own proposed countermeasures: rejecting detections that occur during Bob's dead time restricts eavesdropping to lower gate frequencies, closing the dead-time loophole; separately, searching for suspiciously closely-timed detection events provides partial gating-window discrimination, though full timing-based discrimination of after-gate vs in-gate clicks remains highly non-trivial because the avalanche-build-up jitter is comparable to the gate length itself [Wiechers2011]. |
CM-0061 Detector's Dead Time Management |
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
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Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) — the after-gate attack drives the gated APD's photon-detection physics with bright optical pulses in the linear-mode-outside-gate regime [Wiechers2011]. |
L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) | Primary Target |
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Electronics & Analog Components — the avalanche-electronics dead-time prolongation and the comparator-threshold quantisation that converts the linear-mode photocurrent into a click are downstream of the optical trigger [Wiechers2011]. |
L2 — Electronics & Analog Components | Secondary Effect |
| Relation type | Description | Technique |
|---|---|---|
| Refined by |
Lydersen2011b explicitly presents its gated-APD result as the faint after-gate attack, a direct refinement of Wiechers2011's original after-gate attack (A-0074): it uses far fainter trigger pulses at the edge of the gate, removing A-0074's two practical weaknesses: afterpulse-induced errors and detectability by an optical power meter [Lydersen2011b]. |
A-0075 Detector Control by Exploiting Superlinearity |
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