| Open Access SQOUTInformation Leakage Through Electromagnetic Radiation
The threat actor (Eve) measures the electromagnetic radiation emitted by the transmitter (Alice) and/or receiver (Bob) to infer information about the generated key in a Quantum Key Distribution system.
Literature
| [BSI2023] | BSI. "Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems". (2023) https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/QKD-Systems/QKD-Systems.pdf. |
| [Kim2018] | S. Kim, S. Jin, Y. Lee, B. Park, H. Kim, and S. Hong. "Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on Quantum Key Distribution" In: 2018 International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC), Jeju, Korea (South), 736-739. (2018) 10.1109/ICTC.2018. 8539703. |
| [Molotkov2013] | S. Molotkov. "On the quantum-mechanical bound on the loss of information through side channels in quantum cryptography" In: Jetp Lett. 97, 604–610. (2013) 10.1134/S002136401310007X. |
| [Molotkov2019] | S. Molotkov, K. Balygin, A. Klimov, and S. Kulik. "Active sensing and side channels of information leakage in quantum cryptography" In: Laser Physics 29, 124001. (2019) 10.1088/1555-6611/ab4bd9. |
| [Molotkov2020c] | S. Molotkov. "On the Side Quantum-Classical Binary Channel of Information Leakage with Gaussian Noise" In: Jetp Lett. 111, 506–511. (2020) 10.1134/S0021364020090088. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 2
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Application of TEMPEST principles, e.g. electromagnetic shielding such as Faraday cage. |
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Include this attack in your security proof. |