Non-Random Phase Attack

System

The Non-Random Phase Attack is a sophisticated strategy targeting decoy-state-based QKD, e.g. BB84, protocols, where it exploits the lack of randomness in the relative phase between emitted quantum states. By discerning the global phase of quantum states, a threat actor (Eve) can perform unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurements to differentiate signal from decoy states without disturbing the transmitted quantum information. This vulnerability opens a pathway for a photon number splitting (PNS) attack.

The recorded outcome is partial knowledge of the key: the transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob) accept a key Eve can partly read, while the detection statistics they monitor look normal [Tang2013a]. The bright reference pulse used in the original demonstration is a convenience rather than a requirement, since Eve can prepare her own phase reference, so any decoy-state system whose source phase is predictable is exposed [Tang2013a].

Literature 4
[BSI2023] BSI. "Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems". (2023) https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/QKD-Systems/QKD-Systems.pdf.
[Cao2020] Z. Cao. "Discrete-phase-randomized measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution" (2020) 10.1103/PhysRevA.101.062325.
[CurrasLorenzo2022] G. Curras-Lorenzo, K. Tamaki, and M. Curty. "Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect phase randomisation" In: Quantum Sci. Technol. 9, 015025. (2024) 10.1088/2058-9565/ad141c. arXiv:2210.08183.
[Tang2013a] Y. Tang, H. Yin, X. Ma, C. Fung, Y. Liu, H. Yong, T. Chen, C. Peng, Z. Chen, and J. Pan. "Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information" In: Phys. Rev. A 88, 022308. (2013) 10.1103/PhysRevA.88.022308.
QID: A-0055
UUID: e170179e-fb7c-4d22-aac3-1252d938a04d
Tier: T0
Type: Quantum
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
Tactic: Execution
Created: 2024-04-04
Updated: 2026-11-10
Maturity: Theoretical
Technique properties

Attack type: Key extraction
Attack category: Non-random phase attack
Target party: Transmitter
Target function: Quantum layer
Quantum channel: Fibre optic, Free space
Security layers: L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) L3 — Firmware & Software Drivers
Maturity: Theoretical
Operational properties

Technique → Countermeasures 3
Description Countermeasure

Passive phase randomisation, for example by operating the laser in a gain-switched mode instead of pulse carving [BSI2023].

CM-0037 Passive Phase Randomisation

Active randomisation of the phase.

CM-0015 Active Phase Randomisation

Incorporate the imperfection in security proof.

CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof
Technique → Security Layers 2
Description Category Impact Type

Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) is the primary target. The threat actor (Eve) reads the global phase of the transmitter's (Alice's) weak coherent pulses with a passive linear-optics unambiguous-state-discrimination (USD) measurement on the optical signal, distinguishing signal from decoy states without disturbing the encoded quantum information [Tang2013a].

L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) Primary Target

Firmware & Software Drivers is a prerequisite layer. The attack requires that the source phase-randomisation step, a control/driver responsibility (active randomisation driven by a QRNG, or a passive-randomisation design choice), is absent or improperly implemented. Tang2013a notes phase randomisation is a step assumed in conventional security analyses but sometimes neglected in practice [Tang2013a].

L3 — Firmware & Software Drivers Prerequisite for Attack
Related Techniques 3
Relation type Description Technique
Alternative to

A-0056 is the partial-phase counterpart and marks this technique's boundary. A-0055 assumes the global phase is simply not randomised and needs no reverse path; A-0056 tampers with an active randomiser in a two-way plug-and-play setup so that the phase becomes only partially random. [Tang2013a] notes the photon-number channel model may be violated even when Eve holds only partial phase information, citing A-0056's primary source, so the two are alternatives over the same weakness class rather than parent and child.

A-0056 Partially-Random-Phase Attack
Alternative to

A-0067 reaches the same place by a different route: it separates signal from decoy pulses by the frequency shift an intensity modulator's rising edge imprints, rather than by discriminating the global phase, and then runs the same photon-number-splitting step [BSI2023]. The two are alternative routes to the same splitting attack, so a deployment that closes one does not close the other.

A-0067 Wavelength-Selected Photon-Number-Splitting Attack
Variant of

This technique is photon-number splitting with a discrimination stage in front: the unambiguous state discrimination labels each pulse signal or decoy so that the splitting stage is no longer bounded by the decoy-state estimator [Tang2013a].

A-0044 Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) Attack
Techniques Relating to This One 1
Relation type Description Technique
Preceded by

Laser seeding creates the condition that A-0055 Non-Random Phase Attack exploits. [Sun2015a] shows the emitted pulses' phase distribution collapsing from uniform to Gaussian under injected control light, and A-0055 is the catalogued technique that turns a non-random global phase into distinguishability between signal and decoy states. This is the DV half of the door-opener chain that outcome_class door_opened and produces_resource side_channel_trace encode.

A-0063 Laser Seeding Attack (LSA)
See Also
A-0053 External Magnetic Field Attack on Optical Isolators and Circulators
A-0054 Phase-Remapping Attack
A-0056 Partially-Random-Phase Attack
A-0057 Frequency-Shift Attack
A-0058 Laser Damage Attack on Quantum Communication Systems