Blinding Attack with Faked States
In the Blinding and Faked States Attack on quantum key distribution systems, the threat actor (Eve) uses tailored bright illumination to manipulate the receiver's (Bob's) single-photon detectors from operating in their sensitive Geiger mode to a less sensitive linear mode [Lydersen2010a]. With Bob's detectors held in linear mode, Eve performs an intercept-resend with classical faked-state pulses that force Bob's detectors to click only when his basis matches Eve's intended choice, effectively allowing Eve to control the key generation process without introducing detectable errors [Makarov2006].
Control of Bob's clicks is not the end of the attack, it is the middle. Because Alice and Bob discuss sifting, error correction and privacy amplification openly, Eve listens to that ordinary public traffic and repeats the same operations Bob performs, which hands her the identical final secret key rather than merely the raw key [Lydersen2010a,Gerhardt2011].
This entry is the family root. Detector control has been shown for all three avalanche-photodiode quench families, and a full eavesdropper has been run only against passively-quenched detectors [Gerhardt2011,Sauge2011]. The three families are passively-quenched, actively-quenched and gated, and the only thing that changes between them is the kind of bright light needed to push the detector into its classical regime [Sauge2011]. The per-family device work lives on the three child entries.
| [Gerhardt2011] | I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Makarov. "Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system" In: Nature Communications 2, 349. (2011) 10.1038/ncomms1348. |
| [Krelina2025] | Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. |
| [Lydersen2010a] | L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov. "Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination" In: Nature Photon 4, 686. (2010) 10.1038/nphoton.2010.214. |
| [Lydersen2010b] | L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov. "Reply to ”Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography”" In: Nature Photon 4, 801. (2010) 10.1038/nphoton.2010.278. |
| [Lydersen2010c] | L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov. "Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography" In: Opt. Express 18, 27938–27954. (2010) 10.1364/OE.18.027938. |
| [Makarov2005] | V. Makarov and D. Hjelme. "Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystem" In: Journal of Modern Optics, 52(5), 691–705. (2005) 10.1080/09500340410001730986. |
| [Makarov2006] | V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar. "Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems" In: Phys. Rev. A 74, 022313. (2006) 10.1103/PhysRevA.74.022313. |
| [Makarov2008] | V. Makarov and J. Skaar. "Faked states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols" In: Quant. Inf. Comp. 8, 0622–0635. (2008) 10.26421/QIC8.6-7-4. |
| [Makarov2009] | V. Makarov. "Controlling passively quenched single photon detectors by bright light" In: New Journal of Physics 11, 065003. (2009) 10.1088/1367-2630/11/6/065003. |
| [Sauge2011] | S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov. "Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light" In: Opt. Express 19, 23590-23600. (2011) 10.1364/OE.19.023590. |
| [Shen2022] | Lijiong Shen and Christian Kurtsiefer. "Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing" (2022) 10.48550/arXiv.2204.06155. arXiv:2204.06155. |
| [Yuan2010] | Z. Yuan, J. Dynes, and A. Shields. "Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD" In: Nature Photon 4, 800–801. (2010) 10.1038/nphoton.2010.269. |
| [Yuan2011] | Z. Yuan, J. Dynes, and A. Shields. "Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography" In: Appl. Phys. Lett. 98, 231104. (2011) 10.1063/1.3597221. |
| [Zhang2021] | G. Zhang, I. W. Primaatmaja, J. Y. Haw, X. Gong, C. Wang, and C. C. W. Lim. "Securing Practical Quantum Communication Systems with Optical Power Limiters" (2021) 10.1103/PRXQuantum.2.030304. https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PRXQuantum.2.030304. |
4a998fe9-666b-42f0-a5cc-7d587ade6fea
- Quantum Communication
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Detector monitoring is the umbrella control for this technique: a family of checks on the receiver's (Bob's) detectors intended to reveal that they have stopped behaving as single-photon counters. Two of this technique's primaries recommend it in general terms. [Makarov2006] leads its protection measures with measuring detector characteristics, especially sensitivity versus time, over a variety of input signals including those well beyond the normal operating range, which is exactly the regime bright-light blinding occupies and the regime a normal acceptance test never visits. [Sauge2011] states the operational form, that countermeasures for all detectors considered may also include monitoring the APD bias voltage, current and temperature. This technique is the parent of three quench-class techniques, and its children carry the fine-grained monitors whose thresholds differ per device. Of CM-0017's own children, this technique separately links CM-0018 electrical-parameter monitoring and CM-0020 detector sensitivity checking, which qualifies at family altitude because [Shen2022] shows self-testing makes no assumptions about the specific nature of the detection mechanism. CM-0019 photocurrent monitoring is linked on the children, because it turns on per-device thresholds. Read as a whole, this control makes silent blinding harder rather than impossible. [Gerhardt2011] is explicit that a countermeasure that incorporates into the existing security proofs had not yet been implemented. |
CM-0017 Detector Monitoring |
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Signal Upconversion shifts the detection wavelength so the bright-illumination wavelength used to blind the APD is filtered out before reaching the single-photon detector — a wavelength-isolation defence against the bright-light injection mechanism [Lydersen2010a]. And what sits behind it. [Sauge2011], also a primary of this technique, observes that single-photon modules of the kind it controlled may be used after upconverting telecom-wavelength qubits into the visible and near-infrared range. That describes the ordinary architecture of an upconversion receiver rather than a niche case, so the conversion stage typically terminates on a detector that is itself blindable. The control relocates the attack surface upstream; it does not remove it from the receiver. |
CM-0024 Signal Upconversion |
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A watchdog detector taps a fraction of the light arriving at the receiver's (Bob's) optical input and raises an alarm when the incoming power exceeds anything a single-photon channel should carry. Against this technique it has a large signal to work with, because the blinding beam and the trigger pulses are orders of magnitude above the legitimate photon flux, and [Gerhardt2011] proposes exactly this, noting the incoming blinding light may be detected either by a separate watchdog detector or by monitoring electrical and thermal parameters of the APDs. The watchdog is sited at the receiver-module input rather than at the detector, so it sees the light before the avalanche photodiode does. The limit is as important as the mechanism, and both primaries state it. [Lydersen2010a] writes that an optical power meter at the receiver's entrance with a classical threshold seems like an adequate countermeasure to prevent blinding. However, the power meter output should be included into a security proof, and further, the click threshold at the transition between linear and Geiger mode may be very low, allowing practically non-detectable control pulses. [Sauge2011] reaches the same conclusion, holding that the classical threshold for the optical power must originate from a more general security proof. So the watchdog catches the loud part of the attack and may miss the decisive part. The finer-grained instrument row, CM-0025 Optical Power Meter, is a child of this control and is linked on the three quench-class children of this technique, where per-device threshold choices belong. |
CM-0011 Watchdog Detector |
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
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Post-Processing and Cryptographic layer. The attack does not break sifting, error correction or privacy amplification, it rides them. Holding a sifted key identical to the receiver's (Bob's), the threat actor (Eve) re-runs the same public algorithms on her own copy and derives the same secret key, so the layer produces a correct result that is nonetheless fully known to her. [Gerhardt2011] records that she also reads the unencrypted classical channel and computes the final secret key from it, and [Lydersen2010a] gives the same replay in its own terms. Secondary rather than primary, because the compromise originates at the detector on L1 and reaches this layer as a consequence. |
L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic | Secondary Effect |
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Electronics & Analog Components — the Geiger to linear mode transition is governed by the APD bias circuit, quenching electronics, and bias-resistor impedance; the discriminator threshold Ith becomes an optical-power threshold Pth in linear mode. At family altitude. The impedances above are gated-detector numbers and belong to child A-0073; what generalises is that the quench circuit is precisely the part that differs between the three avalanche-photodiode families, and that difference is why each needs a different kind of light to reach the classical regime. [Sauge2011] identifies the type of bright illumination as the only detector-dependent aspect of an otherwise identical attack, and shows the actively-quenched case reaching linear mode through its quench operational amplifier, thermo-electric cooler and high-voltage converter rather than through any bias resistor at all. The analog layer is therefore where the family's variation lives, while the optical layer above it is where its commonality lives. |
L2 — Electronics & Analog Components | Secondary Effect |
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Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) — the attack drives Bob's single-photon detectors with tailored bright illumination, exploiting the APD's optical response below the breakdown voltage where the detector behaves as a classical photodetector [Lydersen2010a]. |
L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) | Primary Target |
| Relation type | Description | Technique |
|---|---|---|
| Alternative to |
A-0078 carries the same faked-state detector-control strategy against a different detector family by a different physical route. Instead of driving an avalanche photodiode out of Geiger mode, the threat actor uses power above the threshold that breaks the superconducting state of a nanowire detector, then stops illuminating so the targeted detector recovers on cue. The neighbours are related in the evidence rather than by analogy: [Sauge2011], one of this family's own primaries, remarks that a very similar bright-light control method is also applicable to a superconducting nanowire based single photon detector. The boundary is worth stating on this row because it is what keeps the family's hardware claims honest: the generality statements of [Lydersen2010a] are about avalanche photodiodes, and the nanowire case is a sibling rather than an instance. |
A-0078 Illuminating and Faked States Attack on SNSPDs |
| Precedes |
The published framework's blinding chain follows this step with post-processing of the intercepted data, which turns the sifted key the threat actor holds into the final key [Krelina2025]. |
A-0040 Adversary Post-Processing |
| Relation type | Description | Technique |
|---|---|---|
| Has variant |
Lydersen2011b frames the classic deterministic detector-blinding attack (A-0070) as the extreme special case of the more general imperfect detector-control attack this technique presents: A-0075 is the faint/moderate-superlinearity variant of the same underlying detector-control family A-0070 founded, trading a fully deterministic click for a tunable, non-zero-QBER partial leak [Lydersen2011b]. |
A-0075 Detector Control by Exploiting Superlinearity |
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