Blinding Attack Using Dead Time
The Blinding Attack Using Dead Time exploits the inherent dead time of Avalanche Photodiodes (APDs) in QKD systems to gain knowledge of the key without needing to detect legitimate quantum signals. By selectively blinding all detectors except one during their dead time, the attacker can ascertain which detector remains active during a legitimate detection event, bypassing the need for complex faked-state strategies.
Update ([Weier2011]): Critically, the threat actor (Eve) never intercepts or measures Alice's photons at all: she only injects her own dim, correctly-polarised pulses into the channel and passively listens to the public sifting exchange. The legitimate photon Bob receives is measured normally by Bob's own equipment; Eve simply already knows in advance which detector was left able to register it.
| [Burenkov2010] | V. Burenkov, B. Qi, B. Fortescue, H.-K. Lo. "Security of high speed quantum key distribution with finite detector dead time" (2014) 10.26421/QIC14.3-4-2. arXiv:1005.0272. |
| [Gerhardt2011a] | I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, V. Scarani, V. Makarov, and C. Kurtsiefer. "Experimentally Faking the Violation of Bells Inequalities" In: Phys. Rev. Lett. 107, 170404. (2011) 10.1103/PhysRevLett.107.170404. |
| [Jain2016] | N. Jain and G. Kanter. "Upconversion-based receivers for quantum hacking-resistant quantum key distribution" In: Quantum Inf Process 15, 2863–2879. (2016) 10.1007/s11128-016-1315-y. |
| [Qi2007] | B. Qi, C. Fung, H. Lo, and X. Ma. "Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems" In: Quant. Inf. Comp. 7, 073–082. (2007) 10.26421/QIC7.1-2-3. |
| [Rogers2007] | D. Rogers, J. Bienfang, A. Nakassis, H. Xu, and C. Clark. "Detector dead-time effects and paralyzability in high-speed quantum key distribution" In: New J. Phys. 9, 19. (2007) 10.1088/1367-2630/9/9/319. |
| [Weier2011] | H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter. "Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors" In: New Journal of Physics 13, 073024. (2011) 10.1088/1367-2630/13/7/073024. |
| [Xu2006] | H. Xu, L. Ma, J. Bienfang, and X. Tang. "Infuence of avalanche-photodiode dead time on the security of high-speed quantum-key distribution systems" In: Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics and 2006 Quantum Electronics and Laser Science Conference, Long Beach, CA, pp. 1-2. (2006) 10.1109/CLEO.2006.4628713. |
| [Zhao2008] | Y. Zhao, C. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H. Lo. "Quantum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems" In: Phys. Rev. A 78, 042333. (2008) 10.1103/PhysRevA.78.042333. |
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- Quantum Communication
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Signal upconversion lets a detection happen only in the presence of a pump pulse [Jain2016]. Eve's pulse must arrive before Bob's acceptance window [Weier2011], so if the pump pulse is no longer than that window, her pulse meets no pump and causes no click. The detector behind the conversion still has its own dead time, so the control holds only under that timing condition. |
CM-0024 Signal Upconversion |
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Detector's Dead Time Management (simultaneous hold-off of all detectors when one goes dead) is functionally the same defence [Weier2011] itself proposes: gate key generation on events where ALL detectors are simultaneously confirmed active. |
CM-0061 Detector's Dead Time Management |
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
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Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical): the attack directly drives the physical dead-time recovery behaviour of Bob's single-photon avalanche detectors with precisely-timed weak optical pulses [Weier2011]. This is the primary layer the technique targets. |
L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) | Primary Target |
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Electronics & Analog Components: the length of the dead-time window is set by the detector's quench electronics (active or passive quenching), a secondary layer the attack's timing precision depends on [Weier2011]. |
L2 — Electronics & Analog Components | Secondary Effect |
| Relation type | Description | Technique |
|---|---|---|
| Alternative to |
The two techniques exploit the same device property and reach a comparable outcome by opposite routes, and the contrast is the clearest way to say what this one is. A-0076's threat actor injects dim correctly-polarised pulses to drive chosen detectors into dead time, so she creates the asymmetry; here she waits for the link's own traffic to create it and only listens, because "she does not interfere with the quantum signals" [Burenkov2010]. That is why A-0076 needs optical access to the channel, a pulsed source and timing electronics while this technique needs none of them. Neither generalises the other. |
A-0085 Dead Time Correlation Attack |
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