Information Leakage Through Electromagnetic Radiation

System

The threat actor (Eve) measures the electromagnetic radiation emitted by the transmitter (Alice) to infer information about the generated key in a Quantum Key Distribution system.

Nothing is sent and nothing is touched. Because the attack never reaches the optical path, the error-rate check that QKD relies on to notice an eavesdropper never fires, so the two parties finish a run that looks healthy while the threat actor walks away with a copy of their key. The measurement is passive, which leaves the operator no reliable way to tell that it happened, so the defence has to be emission control, shielding and distance rather than detection [Fujiwara2026].

Literature 11
[Baliuka2023] Nikita Baliuka, Markus Stöcker, Michael Auer, Peter Freiwang, Harald Weinfurter, Lukas Knips. "Deep-learning-based radio-frequency side-channel attack on quantum key distribution" (2023) 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.20.054040. arXiv:2310.13738.
[BSI2023] BSI. "Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems". (2023) https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/QKD-Systems/QKD-Systems.pdf.
[Durak2022] Kadir Durak, Naser C. Jam, Saeid Karamzadeh. "Attack to Quantum Cryptosystems Through RF Fingerprints From Photon Detectors" In: IEEE J. Sel. Top. Quantum Electron. 28(2), 6400107 (2022). (2022) 10.1109/JSTQE.2021.3089638.
[ETSI016PP] ETSI. "Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Common Criteria Protection Profile - Pair of Prepare and Measure Quantum Key Distribution Modules". In: ETSI GS QKD 016. (2024) https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/QKD/001_099/016/02.01.01_60/gs_QKD016v020101p.pdf.
[Fujiwara2026] Mikio Fujiwara, Katsumi Fujii, Fumie Ono, Masakazu Ono, Akihisa Tomita. "Electromagnetic Side-Channel Vulnerability in QKD Equipment" (2026) 10.1109/ACCESS.2026.3737227.
[ISOIEC23837P1] ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27. "ISO/IEC DIS 23837-1:2022 Information security - Security requirements, test and evaluation methods for quantum key distribution - Part 1: Requirements". (2022) Draft International Standard (DIS) 2022 of ISO/IEC 23837-1. The published standard is ISOIEC23837 (ISO/IEC 23837-1:2023); clause numbers and wording can differ..
[Kim2018] S. Kim, S. Jin, Y. Lee, B. Park, H. Kim, and S. Hong. "Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on Quantum Key Distribution" In: 2018 International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC), Jeju, Korea (South), 736-739. (2018) 10.1109/ICTC.2018.8539703.
[Molotkov2013] S. Molotkov. "On the quantum-mechanical bound on the loss of information through side channels in quantum cryptography" In: Jetp Lett. 97, 604–610. (2013) 10.1134/S002136401310007X.
[Molotkov2019] S. Molotkov, K. Balygin, A. Klimov, and S. Kulik. "Active sensing and side channels of information leakage in quantum cryptography" In: Laser Physics 29, 124001. (2019) 10.1088/1555-6611/ab4bd9.
[Molotkov2020c] S. Molotkov. "On the Side Quantum-Classical Binary Channel of Information Leakage with Gaussian Noise" In: Jetp Lett. 111, 506–511. (2020) 10.1134/S0021364020090088.
[Pantoja2024] John J. Pantoja, Victor A. Bucheli, Ross Donaldson. "Electromagnetic side-channel attack risk assessment on a practical quantum-key-distribution receiver based on multi-class classification" In: EPJ Quantum Technol. 11, 78 (2024). (2024) 10.1140/epjqt/s40507-024-00290-6. https://doi.org/10.1140/epjqt/s40507-024-00290-6.
QID: A-0095
UUID: 3f227a20-e11b-48b6-90b4-a5d76939ac8a
Tier: T0
Type: Classical
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
Tactic: Execution
Created: 2024-06-07
Updated: 2026-11-13
Maturity: Experimental
Technique properties

Attack type: Key extraction, Information obtaining
Attack category: Classical side-channel attack
Target party: Transmitter
Target function: Quantum layer, System control and management
Quantum channel: Fibre optic, Free space
Security layers: L2 — Electronics & Analog Components L7 — Operational Security
Maturity: Experimental
Operational properties

Technique → Countermeasures 2
Description Countermeasure

Folding the leak into the security proof is the second of the two countermeasures the source of record proposes for this attack, and it names the tools for it, chosen because they do not need to know the side-channel states and can protect against general adversary models [BSI2023]; both of those papers are already in this control's own literature. What a proof would have to absorb is quantified in one place only. The passive side channel reduces to an additional binary classical channel between Alice and Bob with error probability pp, the distillable secret-key fraction for a purely passive read is h(p)h(p), and where the threat actor also attacks the quantum states the fraction becomes h(p)−χ(p,ϵ)−h(Q)h(p) - \chi(p,\epsilon) - h(Q), with χ\chi the Holevo information available on a joint collective measurement of the side radiation together with the information states [Molotkov2019]. The same analysis gives the operator something to measure rather than assume, since pp should be measured for each specific implementation of the system through the detection of side radiation [Molotkov2019]. The mode is neutralises because accounting for the leaked information in privacy amplification removes its value rather than stopping it escaping.

CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof

Emanation-security design of the quantum device, the TEMPEST analogue this control is named for, is the measure this technique answers to, and it is the only one in the source set whose effect has been measured rather than recommended. On a sender board, a revised design using a ball-grid-array FPGA with attention to differential signal routing, grounding and decoupling capacitors, and with critical signals routed in layers shielded by a ground and a supply-voltage plane, cut the distance at which the attack still worked from 9 cm to 5 cm, and adding metallic shielding a few millimetres thick left the attack no better than random guessing (figures from arXiv:2310.13738v1) [Baliuka2023]. On a real prototype, closing the EM-shielding rack door attenuated the above-noise peaks by 12.7 to 36.6 dB, 21.2 dB on average, with only the clock peak staying above the noise; the authors conclude that the shield removes the components used for state estimation [Fujiwara2026]. The site perimeter is a separate control, CM-0119.

CM-0030 Quantum Device Optimal Design and TEMPEST
Technique → Security Layers 2
Description Category Impact Type

Electronics and Analog Components is the layer this technique attacks, because what leaks is radiation from electronics, not light: the transmitter's (Alice's) electronics, such as the phase modulator named in this row's own description [BSI2023].

Update ([Baliuka2023] [Fujiwara2026]): on the transmitter side the layer is wider than the modulator. The radiating path is the electric signal path from the random number generators to the optical modulators, and on a real prototype the state-dependent radiation was attributed to the digital-control circuits rather than the modulation drivers, because that device uses a highly symmetric driving signal scheme [Fujiwara2026]. On the one sender board whose whole surface was mapped, the strongest state-correlated emitter was the field-programmable gate array, and the same measurement warns against judging by amplitude, because the voltage regulator radiated strongly while carrying nothing correlated with the symbols, so test accuracy cannot be inferred from the amplitude of recorded emissions [Baliuka2023]. The design levers are at this layer too, namely board layout, grounding, decoupling and shielding [Baliuka2023].

L2 — Electronics & Analog Components Primary Target

Operational Security is a secondary effect of this technique and the layer the defence actually answers on. The governing protection profile puts the obligation there by name, requiring that the security perimeter ensure that any emanations of the TOE cannot be detected outside the access controlled area, except signals conveyed on the QKD link (clause 8.2.3) [ETSI016PP], and the draft ISO/IEC DIS 23837-1 likewise hands these attacks to the physical protection of the operational environment [ISOIEC23837P1]. Fujiwara2026 frames the whole problem as trusted-node policy, since ensuring node security requires preventing information leakage caused by external observation of the QKD devices installed in the trusted node [Fujiwara2026]. Secondary rather than primary, because the emission originates at L2 and a perimeter does not remove it.

L7 — Operational Security Secondary Effect
Techniques Relating to This One 1
Relation type Description Technique
Alternative to

A-0095 Information Leakage Through Electromagnetic Radiation reads the same electronics by the other coupling path. A-0095 picks up radiated emission at a standoff, which is why its controls are shielding and TEMPEST, while this technique reads the conducted supply current at the rail, which shielding does not reduce [Zheng2021] [Dacosta2025]. ETSI GS QKD 008 clause 4.8 treats them as separate obligations, requiring protection against simple power analysis and differential power analysis and electromagnetic emanation in three distinct sentences, the last being "The QKD module shall protect the module's CSPs against EME." [ETSI008]. An operator who has done one has not done the other, and the two rows should be assessed together.

A-0101 Power Consumption Analysis Attack on State Preparation in QKD Systems
See Also
A-0087 Timing Mismatch Attack on Signal and Decoy States
A-0088 Frequency Side Channel Attack in Twin-Field QKD
A-0096 Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack
A-0097 Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack on CV-QKD
A-0098 Saturation Attack