Illuminating and Faked States Attack on SNSPDs
The threat actor (Eve) takes control of a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) at the receiver (Bob) by shining bright light into his ordinary optical input, so his equipment records the detection she chooses rather than the photon the transmitter (Alice) sent. She sits in the quantum channel, measures Alice's states with a copy of Bob's receiver, and then drives Bob's detectors with a timed sequence of bright and dark light so that each click matches her own measurement. Two routes reach that state: intense light can force the nanowire into a non-responsive latched condition, or it can prolong the recovery that follows an ordinary detection.
Because Bob's record is her record, no errors appear. The attack does not stop at the raw key: Eve listens to the ordinary public discussion in which Alice and Bob sift, correct errors and apply privacy amplification, repeats those steps on her own copy, and ends up holding the identical final secret key [Iwakoshi2015]. The bright light does not damage the detector, but a latched detector stays blind until its bias current is reset [Lydersen2011]; what lasts is the compromise of the key.
| [Alhussein2019] | M. Alhussein, K. Inoue, and T. Honjo. "Monitoring coincident clicks in differential-quadrature-phase shift QKD to reveal detector blinding and control attacks" In: Jpn. J. Appl. Phys. 58, 012006. (2019) 10.7567/1347-4065/aaec1c. |
| [Alhussein2019a] | M. Alhussein and K. Inoue. "Differential phase shift quantum key distribution with variable loss revealing blinding and control side-channel attacks" In: Jpn. J. Appl. Phys. 58, 102001. (2019) 10.7567/1347-4065/ab42c7. |
| [Elezov2019] | M. Elezov, R. Ozhegov, G. Goltsman, and V. Makarov. "Countermeasure against bright-light attack on superconducting nanowire single-photon detector in quantum key distribution" In: Opt. Express 27, 30979–30988. (2019) 10.1364/OE.27.030979. |
| [Fujiwara2013] | M. Fujiwara, T. Honjo, K. Shimizu, K. Tamaki, and M. Sasaki. "Characteristics of superconducting single photon detector in DPS-QKD system under bright illumination blinding attack" In: Opt. Express 21, 6304-6312. (2013) 10.1364/OE.21.006304. |
| [Gras2021] | G. Gras, D. Rusca, H. Zbinden, F. Bussieres. "Countermeasure against quantum hacking using detection statistics" (2021) 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.15.034052. arXiv:2010.08474. |
| [Honjo2013] | T. Honjo, M. Fujiwara, K. Shimizu, K. Tamaki, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, H. Terai, Z. Wang, and M. Sasaki. "Countermeasure against tailored bright illumination attack for DPS-QKD" In: Opt. Express 21, 2667-2673. (2013) 10.1364/OE.21.002667. |
| [Iwakoshi2015] | T. Iwakoshi. "Faked state attacks on realistic round robin DPS quantum key distribution systems and countermeasure" In: Proc. SPIE 9505, Quantum Optics and Quantum Information Transfer and Processing 2015, 950504. (2015) 10.1117/12.2176770. |
| [Koashi2025] | M. Koashi, A. Tomita, G. Kato, M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, K. Yoshino, S. Hirashita, Y. Tanizawa, A. Murakami, K. Yamaya. "Evaluation Method for Protection Profile for Prepare and Measure Quantum Key Distribution Modules (QF-TD-QKD-2025-002_SDv1.0)". (2025) https://qforum.org/assets/documents/20250513-SD(1.0).pdf. |
| [Lydersen2011] | L. Lydersen, M. Akhlaghi, A. Majedi, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov. "Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector using tailored bright illumination" In: New J. Phys. 13 113042. (2011) 10.1088/1367-2630/13/11/113042. |
| [Tanner2014] | M. Tanner, V. Makarov, and R. Hadfield. "Optimised quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors" In: Opt. Express 22, 6734-6748. (2014) 10.1364/OE.22.006734. |
f34a9414-b1df-4b6f-990c-992636fee358
- Quantum Communication
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Bring the detector's actual bright-light response inside the security proof rather than assuming it away. [Tanner2014] calls this the preferred action, ahead of the band-aid patches it then lists, and [Lydersen2011] notes that more advanced proofs could admit such a response under certain conditions. |
CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof |
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An upconversion stage converts the arriving signal to a shorter wavelength in a nonlinear process and the converted light is measured on an avalanche photodiode, so the superconducting nanowire leaves the receiver's optical path altogether. The weakness this technique exploits is a property of the nanowire itself, bright light making a large fraction of its length normally conductive [Lydersen2011], and that mechanism has nothing to act on once the component is gone. |
CM-0024 Signal Upconversion |
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The control class: monitor the optical power arriving at the receiver's input and alarm when it exceeds what a single-photon receiver should ever see. The blinding beam is orders of magnitude above single-photon level and must pass the input before it reaches the nanowire, so the class is the right answer in principle, and the normative evaluation method for the prepare-and-measure Protection Profile treats a light-injection monitor inside the Target of Evaluation as the condition for satisfying FPT_PHP.3 [Koashi2025]. |
CM-0011 Watchdog Detector |
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
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Physical layer, quantum and optical. The attack drives the receiver's nanowire detector with bright light, making a large fraction of its length normally conductive and exploiting the hotspot formation that persists through the recovery [Lydersen2011]. |
L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) | Primary Target |
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Electronics and analog components. Whether the optical effect yields control is decided in the readout: the comparator threshold sets the band where control works and above it the latched route fails, the amplifier coupling determines what the blinded state looks like, and the bias circuit governs the recovery [Lydersen2011]. |
L2 — Electronics & Analog Components | Secondary Effect |
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Post-processing and cryptographic layer. The attack does not break sifting, error correction or privacy amplification, it rides them: holding a sifted key identical to the receiver's, the threat actor re-runs the same public algorithms and derives the same secret key, so the layer produces a correct result that is nonetheless fully known to her [Iwakoshi2015]. |
L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic | Secondary Effect |
| Relation type | Description | Technique |
|---|---|---|
| Alternative to |
A-0078 carries the same faked-state detector-control strategy against a different detector family by a different physical route. Instead of driving an avalanche photodiode out of Geiger mode, the threat actor uses power above the threshold that breaks the superconducting state of a nanowire detector, then stops illuminating so the targeted detector recovers on cue. The neighbours are related in the evidence rather than by analogy: [Sauge2011], one of this family's own primaries, remarks that a very similar bright-light control method is also applicable to a superconducting nanowire based single photon detector. The boundary is worth stating on this row because it is what keeps the family's hardware claims honest: the generality statements of [Lydersen2010a] are about avalanche photodiodes, and the nanowire case is a sibling rather than an instance. |
A-0070 Blinding Attack with Faked States |
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