| Open Access SQOUT
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Spatial Misalignment Exploitation in QKD
This attack leverages spatial distinguishability between signal states caused by angular misalignment of laser diodes in free-space quantum key distribution systems. By exploiting these misalignments, the threat actor (Eve) can distinguish between signal states based on their different angles of arrival at a detector array, potentially gaining full knowledge of the key.
Literature
| [ArteagaDiaz2022] | P. Arteaga-Dıaz, D. Cano, and V. Fernandez. "Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures" In: IEEE Access 10, 82697–82705. (2022) 10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3196677. |
| [Huang2019a] | W. Huang, W. Zhang, and Y. Huang. "Elimination of Spatial Side-Channel Information for Compact Quantum Key Distribution Senders" In: J. Electron. Sci. Technol. 17.3, 195–203. (2018) 10.11989/JEST.1674-862X.90416014. |
| [Nauerth2009] | S. Nauerth, M. F¨urst, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, and H. Weinfurter. "Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography" In: New J. Phys. 11, 065001. (2009) 10.1088/1367-2630/11/6/065001. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 4
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
|
Employment of single-mode fiber coupling. |
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Employment of single laser diode. |
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Employment of optical filter. |
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Include the attack in your security proof. |