| Open Access SQOUT

Side Channel Exploitation in Transmitter Imperfections

This attack targets inherent imperfections in the light sources of Quantum Key Distribution systems, exploiting passive side channels to discern information about the key. By analyzing the distinguishability of signal states arising from these imperfections, the threat actor (Eve) can perform sophisticated attacks with reduced error rates, enhancing their ability to decode the transmitted key without detection.

Literature

[Babukhin2020] D. Babukhin and D. Sych. "Intercept-resend attack on passive side channel of the light source in BB84 decoy-state protocol" In: J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 1695, 012119. (2020) 10.1088/1742-6596/1695/1/012119.
[Babukhin2021] D. Babukhin and D. Sych. "Explicit attacks on passive side channels of the light source in the BB84 decoy state protocol" In: J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 1984, 012008. (2021) 10.1088/1742-6596/1984/1/012008.
[Babukhin2022] D. Babukhin and D. Sych. "Joint eavesdropping on the BB84 decoy state protocol with an arbitrary passive light-source side channel". (2022) arXiv:arXiv:2211.13669 [quant-ph].
[Babukhin2022a] D. Babukhin, D. Kronberg, and D. Sych. "Explicit attacks on the BennettBrassard 1984 protocol with partially distinguishable photons" In: Phys. Rev. A 106, 042403. (2022) 10.1103/PhysRevA.106.042403.
[Duplinskiy2021] A. Duplinskiy and D. Sych. "Bounding light source side channels in QKD via Hong-Ou-Mandel interference" In: Phys. Rev. A 104, 012601. (2021) 10.1103/ PhysRevA.104.012601.
[Molotkov2020] S. Molotkov. "Trojan Horse Attacks, Decoy State Method, and Side Channels of Information Leakage in Quantum Cryptography" In: J. Exp. Theor. Phys. 130, 809–832. (2020) 10.1134/S1063776120050064.
[Molotkov2020a] S. Molotkov. "Robustness of Quantum Cryptography Systems with Phase-Time Coding against Active Probing Attacks" In: J. Exp. Theor. Phys. 131, 877–894. (2020) 10.1134/S1063776120110138.
[Molotkov2020b] S. Molotkov and K. Balygin. "Side channels of information leakage in quantum cryptography based on geometrically uniform coherent states" In: Laser Phys. 30, 065201. (2020) 10.1088/1555-6611/ab8298.
[Sych2021] D. Sych, A. Duplinskiy, and D. Babukhin. "Practical security of quantum key distribution in the presence of side channels" In: J. Phys.: Conf. Ser. 1984, 012001. (2020) 10.1088/1742-6596/1984/1/012001.
QID: A-0083
Tier: T0
Type: Quantum
Tactic: Execution
Created: 2024-04-15
Updated: 2024-08-14

Technique → Countermeasures

List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.

Items: 4
Description Countermeasure

Integrating an automated testing module within Alice’s setup can continuously monitor the side channels of laser diodes [Duplinskiy2019].

Use of other protocols, such as MDI-QKD or EB-QKD.

Employ the generalised decoy-state method, which extends the traditional decoy-state approach by considering joint collective measurements [Molotkov2020,Molotkov2020a].

Consider the attack in the security proof.

Including adjusting the security parameters based on observable data at the receiving end, ensuring that the final key remains secure despite any detected vulnerabilities [Molotkov2020b].