Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack

System

The threat actor (Eve) exploits the wavelength dependence of the beamsplitter in the receiver's (Bob's) QKD receiver to control measurement results and obtain information about the key.

Eve intercepts each signal, measures it herself, and resends it at whichever of two wavelengths steers Bob's beamsplitter into the basis she has just used, so his basis choice stops being his own [Li2011]. The calibration-stage form of the attack, in which the receiver is made to mis-calibrate its own detectors, is catalogued under A-0129 Persistent Calibration Sabotage [Fei2018a].

The attack can yield the whole key with a strongly wavelength-dependent splitter. The link keeps reporting a normal error rate while it happens [Li2011]. The attack only works on a receiver that picks its measurement basis passively, by letting each photon choose an output port of a beamsplitter; a receiver that chooses its basis actively is not exposed [Li2011].

Literature 6
[Fei2018a] Y. Fei, X. Meng, M. Gao, Z. Ma, and H. Wang. "Exploiting wavelength-dependent beam splitter to attack the calibration of practical quantum key distribution systems" In: Optik 170, 368–375. (2018) 10.1016/j.ijleo.2018.05.089.
[Fei2018b] Yang-Yang Fei, Xiang-Dong Meng, Ming Gao, Hong Wang, Zhi Ma. "Quantum man-in-the-middle attack on the calibration process of quantum key distribution" In: Sci. Rep. 8, 4283 (2018). (2018) 10.1038/s41598-018-22700-3.
[Gao2025] Binwu Gao, Junxuan Liu, Ekaterina Borisova, Hao Tan, Mingyang Zhong, Zihao Chen, Qingquan Peng, Weixu Shi, Anastasiya Ponosova, Vadim Makarov, Anqi Huang. "Spectral side channels of wavelength-division multiplexer in quantum key distribution under laser damage" (2025) 10.1103/33cb-kvyp. arXiv:2512.11701.
[Li2011] H. Li, S. Wang, J. Huang, W. Chen, Z. Yin, F. Li, Z. Zhou, D. Liu, Y. Zhang, G. Guo, W. Bao, and Z. Han. "Attacking a practical quantum-key-distribution system with wavelength-dependent beam-splitter and multiwavelength sources" In: Phys. Rev. A 84, 062308. (2011) 10.1103/PhysRevA.84.062308.
[Li2022] D. Li, Y. Tang, Y. Zhao, L. Zhou, Y. Zhao, and S. Tang. "Security of Optical Beam Splitter in Quantum Key Distribution" In: Photonics 9, 527. (2022) 10.3390/photonics9080527.
[Tan2025] Hao Tan, Mikhail Petrov, Weiyang Zhang, Liying Han, Sheng-Kai Liao, Vadim Makarov, Feihu Xu, Jian-Wei Pan. "Wide-Spectrum Security of Quantum Key Distribution" (2025) 10.1103/smdh-dcpm.
QID: A-0096
UUID: 47313ec2-ddcc-4ad4-94a4-1bbcbb4237f1
Tier: T0
Type: Quantum
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
Tactic: Execution
Created: 2024-06-18
Updated: 2026-11-13
Maturity: Experimental
Technique properties

Attack type: Key extraction
Attack category: Wavelength-dependent manipulation attack
Target party: Receiver
Target function: Quantum layer, System control and management
Quantum channel: Fibre optic, Free space
Security layers: L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
Maturity: Experimental
Operational properties

Technique → Countermeasures 4
Description Countermeasure

Characterise the beamsplitter's splitting ratio across wavelength before deployment. Li2022 sets the band for inspecting the splitting ratio at 1260 to 1700 nm, from the single-mode cut-off of standard fibre and the operating range of single-photon detectors [Li2022]. Selecting a part that stays within Li2022's 1 dB bound over that band is the separate control CM-0196 Wavelength-Flat Beam Splitter Selection.

CM-0086 Prior Hardware Component Study

Spectral monitoring at the receiver. A filtering module is placed before the quantum state decoding so that the light of the operating wavelength is used for decoding while "The light of non-operating wavelength is separated and measured by a monitoring detector", built from a wavelength-division or dense wavelength-division multiplexer [Li2022]. Li2022 notes a second benefit, that filters increase the system's isolation in the non-operating wavelength region, making it necessary for an eavesdropper to raise her light intensity and so raising the probability of detecting the attack, which is where the spectral filter's genuine value lies once it is paired with a monitor rather than trusted alone. This is also the only one of Li2022's two countermeasures that works on chip-based receivers, since "The countermeasure of error rate alerting is not suitable for chip-based QKD system" and the monitoring countermeasure is the more applicable one there [Li2022].

CM-0011 Watchdog Detector

The answer to the attacker the 3% error-rate alarm cannot see, namely one who throttles her attack below the threshold. Li2022 gives both the model and the fix, deriving a modified secure-key-rate formula that subtracts the revealed information and retains "a secure key rate of over 10 kbps at 100 km and a maximum transmission distance of over 150 km". The papers intend the alarm and the correction as a pair, so this control goes with CM-0007 rather than instead of it [Li2022].

CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof

Real-time error-rate alerting, with the threshold and the two conditions the source attaches to it. Although the overall additional error rate from the attack may be low, one of the two bases will exhibit a significant error rate increase. This anomaly can trigger an error rate alert, serving as an effective countermeasure against the attack [Li2022]. Li2022 sets the threshold, stating that "the monitoring threshold can be set to" 3% or below, "which can effectively detect wavelength-dependent attacks of beam splitters", with the system stopping key exchange and discarding data on alarm. It also states what the monitoring must look at: under a biased basis choice "the QKD system is required to monitor the error rates of the Z and X basis separately, rather than only focusing on the overall error rate", because the overall figure can stay low while one basis spikes. Li2022's own answer to an attacker who throttles below the threshold is the modified secure-key-rate formula, which is carried separately by the imperfection-aware-proof edge on this technique, so the two work as a pair rather than as an alarm alone [Li2022].

CM-0007 Proper Implementation of Quantum Communication Protocol and QBER Estimation
Technique → Security Layers 1
Description Category Impact Type

Physical layer, quantum and optical, and the primary target. The attack is delivered as optical pulses at chosen wavelengths and lands on a passive optical component, since "the realistic beam splitter, made by the fused biconical technology, has wavelength dependent" properties, and on the detectors behind it [Li2011].

L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) Primary Target
Related Techniques 1
Relation type Description Technique
Alternative to

A-0097 is the continuous-variable instance of this same mechanism and says so itself, describing the attack as similar to its counterpart in discrete-variable QKD systems. The two rows share the class vulnerability V-0029 and the beamsplitter carrier HW-0019. Li2011's own class claim covers the shared ground, proposing an attack "which can be applied to all practical QKD systems with the passive state modulation". Neither derives from the other: they are peers selected by which receiver the attacker faces, and neither has a parent [Li2011].

A-0097 Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack on CV-QKD
See Also
A-0088 Frequency Side Channel Attack in Twin-Field QKD
A-0095 Information Leakage Through Electromagnetic Radiation
A-0097 Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack on CV-QKD
A-0098 Saturation Attack
A-0099 Manipulation of Vacuum-Noise Estimation