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Non-Random Phase Attack
The Non-Random Phase Attack is a sophisticated strategy targeting decoy-state-based QKD, e.g. BB84, protocols, where it exploits the lack of randomness in the relative phase between emitted quantum states. By discerning the global phase of quantum states, a threat actor (Eve) can perform unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurements to differentiate signal from decoy states without disturbing the transmitted quantum information. This vulnerability opens a pathway for a photon number splitting (PNS) attack.
Literature
| [BSI2023] | BSI. "Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems". (2023) https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/QKD-Systems/QKD-Systems.pdf. |
| [Tang2013a] | Y. Tang, H. Yin, X. Ma, C. Fung, Y. Liu, H. Yong, T. Chen, C. Peng, Z. Chen, and J. Pan. "Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information" In: Phys. Rev. A 88, 022308. (2013) 10.1103/PhysRevA.88.022308. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 3
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
|
Active randomisation of the phase. |
|
|
Incorporate the imperfection in security proof. |
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