| Open Access SQOUT
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Timing Attack Exploiting Detector Response Times
The Timing Attack via Detector Response Time leverages the slight differences in detector response times or optical path lengths in QKD systems to deduce which detector was triggered by a signal photon. By analyzing publicly shared detection times and correlating them with known detector response characteristics, the threat actor (Eve) can gain unauthorized insights into the quantum key generation process.
Literature
| [LamasLinares2007] | A. Lamas-Linares and C. Kurtsiefer. "Breaking a quantum key distribution system through a timing side channel" In: Opt. Express 15, 9388-9393. (2007) 10.1364/OE.15.009388. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 2
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
|
Consider using a newer QKD protocol, e.g. CV-QKD, that is insensitive to timing variations among detectors. |
|
|
Manage published information. |