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Partially-Random-Phase Attack
In the Partially-Random-Phase Attack, the threat actor (Eve) manipulates the phase encoding process by replacing legitimate laser pulses with her own, specifically timed to exploit imperfections in the transmitter's (Alice's) phase modulator. This results in a controlled reduction of the global phase's randomness, facilitating an intercept-and-resend attack where Eve can more accurately guess the encoded information.
Literature
| [Lo2007] | H.-K. Lo and J. Preskill. "Security of quantum key distribution using weak coherent states with nonrandom phases" In: QIC, vol. 7, no. 5 & 6, pp. 431–458. (2007) 10.26421/QIC7.5-6-2. |
| [Sun2012] | S.-H. Sun, M. Gao, M.-S. Jiang, C.-Y. Li, and L.-M. Liang. "Partially random phase attack to the practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system" In: Phys. Rev. A, vol. 85, no. 3, p. 032304. (2012) 10.1103/PhysRevA.85.032304. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 5
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Use of watchdog monitor. |
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Two-decoy state, where one of which is vacuum [Sun2012]. |
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State preparation monitoring. |
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Include this attack in the full security proof. |