Harden

System

The harden tactic is used to increase the opportunity cost of a system exploitation. Hardening differs from Detection in that it generally is conducted before a system is online and operational.

QID: T-0015
UUID: b5c8cd9d-89b0-493c-bcc5-9e0b34e86a80
Tier: T0
Type: Defence
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
Created: 2024-02-28
Updated: 2026-11-14
Countermeasures 36
QID Title Description
CM-0001 Privacy amplification Privacy Amplification is a countermeasure employed in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems to transform a potentially partially compromised key int…
CM-0002 True Single Photon Source The deployment of the true single-photon source that emits one photon at a time strongly reduces the vulnerabilities associated with multiphoton emis…
CM-0006 Employing Another Quantum Protocol Employing another quantum protocol is a strategy, where switching to alternative QKD protocols can mitigate specific vulnerabilities and enhance secu…
CM-0007 Proper Implementation of Quantum Communication Protocol and QBER Estimation Proper implementation of quantum communication protocol and Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) estimation is crucial for ensuring the resilience of quantu…
CM-0013 Employment of Optical Filters Optical filters in quantum communication systems selectively permit only desired wavelengths or arriving-direction signals to pass.
CM-0015 Active Phase Randomisation Active phase randomisation involves continuously varying the phase of emitted quantum signals to enhance security, with optimal implementation includ…
CM-0030 Quantum Device Optimal Design and TEMPEST The optimal design of quantum communication devices, including QKD nodes, optical ground stations, and communication satellites, is crucial to minimi…
CM-0034 Passive Quantum Communication Transmitters Passive transmitters using a linear optics network and post-selection have no active modulator and might be more robust against side-channel attacks …
CM-0037 Passive Phase Randomisation Implementing passive phase randomisation in QKD, e.g., by operating lasers in gain-switched mode.
CM-0038 Phase Modulator Triggering Triggering phase modulators with incoming bright light pulses to enhance QKD system security.
CM-0039 Bit-Mapped Gating Bit-mapped gating is a countermeasure in QKD systems that randomizes detection mappings to prevent detector-control attacks. It presupposes a gated d…
CM-0041 Laser Pulse-Period Control Laser pulse-period control sets crucial parameters like the pulse repetition period of the laser to prevent synchronization issues.
CM-0043 Detector with Random Jitter Per-pulse randomisation of the detector gating-window arrival time, which smears the detectors' efficiency curves and lowers the mismatch a timing at…
CM-0046 Active Polarisation State Scrambling Active polarization state scrambling enhances QKD receiver security by dynamically altering the polarization states.
CM-0047 Gain Modulation of the Photocurrent Gain modulation of the photocurrent in APDs thwarts thermal attacks by adjusting response to continuous-wave power levels.
CM-0048 Dead Time Enforcement and Gating Window Discrimination Enforcing dead time and discriminating gating windows to secure detection timing in QKD systems.
CM-0053 Detector Reset Mechanism (Active or Passive) Implementing an active reset circuit or a passive shunt resistor to prevent permanent latching of detectors in quantum communication systems [Lyderse…
CM-0055 Single-Mode Fiber Coupling This countermeasure involves coupling all quantum states into a single-mode optical fibre before their release into the free-space channel. This cont…
CM-0056 Single Laser Diode Utilization Single Laser Diode Utilization removes the spatial, spectral and temporal differences between separate lasers by employing a single laser diode for s…
CM-0057 Wavelength Randomization Wavelength randomization has the transmitter (Alice) vary the emission wavelength of its laser diodes at random, within a range it controls, so that …
CM-0061 Detector's Dead Time Management Many techniques exploit a Single-Photon Detector's (SPD's) dead time. Therefore it is appropriate to manage this detector's period, e.g. by simultane…
CM-0062 Management of Published Information In Classical Channel Communication This countermeasure focuses on the meticulous handling of timing data and other potentially revealing information that is shared over public channels…
CM-0063 Employment of External Intensity Modulator Decoy-state QKD needs the transmitter's (Alice's) signal and decoy pulses to be identical in everything except their brightness, because the protocol…
CM-0064 Triple Intensity Modulation for Side Channel Elimination Triple Intensity Modulation technique in TF-QKD systems addresses frequency side channels by modulating signal and reference pulses.
CM-0066 Use of Verifiable Secret Sharing and Privacy Amplification Techniques Employing verifiable secret sharing and privacy amplification techniques to bolster security in QKD systems.
CM-0070 Power Analysis Masquerading and Obscuring A set of changes to a QKD system's classical electronics and post-processing code that hide what the power it draws reveals about the key. The threat…
CM-0076 Tamper Protection Tamper Protection involves implementing security measures to prevent "classical" unauthorized access and alterations to the physical hardware and rel…
CM-0077 End-to-End Encryption for Classical Channels in Quantum Communication Systems End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) is a countermeasure for securing the classical communication channels within quantum communication systems, ensuring tha…
CM-0086 Prior Hardware Component Study Before a quantum key distribution system goes into service, every security-critical hardware component is measured to establish what it actually does…
CM-0098 True Discrete Modulation The goal is to adopt true discrete modulation instead of approximate Gaussian modulation. The discrete modulation can offer better security assurance…
CM-0099 Variable Optical Attenuator Variable optical attenuators (VOAs) can adjust the optical power reaching each photodiode, compensating for the differences in quantum efficiencies a…
CM-0101 Effective Photon Lifetime Management Ensuring that the effective photon lifetime is shorter than the turn-off duration of the laser diode can also help in mitigating phase correlations […
CM-0103 Advanced Laser Diodes Employment of advanced laser diodes in the transmitter can help reduce the attack surface for side-channel attacks. This include, e.g. spectral filte…
CM-0104 Initializing Modulation Devices After Each Pulse Resetting the modulation device after each pulse emission by Alice can minimize pulse correlations and protect the security of QKD systems.
CM-0107 Replacing Intensity Modulators with IQ Modulators Replacing traditional intensity modulators with IQ modulators can reduce pattern effects due to intensity correlations, particularly in decoy-state Q…
CM-0108 Optimizing DC Bias Conditions Finding suitable DC bias levels for laser diodes under specific clock speeds can reduce temporal disparities and intensity fluctuations, thereby miti…
See Also
T-0013 Exfiltration
T-0014 Impact
T-0016 Detect
T-0017 Isolate
T-0018 Deceive