Harden
System
The harden tactic is used to increase the opportunity cost of a system exploitation. Hardening differs from Detection in that it generally is conducted before a system is online and operational.
QID:
T-0015
UUID:
b5c8cd9d-89b0-493c-bcc5-9e0b34e86a80
Tier:
T0
Type:
Defence
Domain(s):
- Quantum Communication
Created:
2024-02-28
Updated:
2026-11-14
On this page
Countermeasures
36
| QID | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|
| CM-0001 | Privacy amplification | Privacy Amplification is a countermeasure employed in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems to transform a potentially partially compromised key int… |
| CM-0002 | True Single Photon Source | The deployment of the true single-photon source that emits one photon at a time strongly reduces the vulnerabilities associated with multiphoton emis… |
| CM-0006 | Employing Another Quantum Protocol | Employing another quantum protocol is a strategy, where switching to alternative QKD protocols can mitigate specific vulnerabilities and enhance secu… |
| CM-0007 | Proper Implementation of Quantum Communication Protocol and QBER Estimation | Proper implementation of quantum communication protocol and Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) estimation is crucial for ensuring the resilience of quantu… |
| CM-0013 | Employment of Optical Filters | Optical filters in quantum communication systems selectively permit only desired wavelengths or arriving-direction signals to pass. |
| CM-0015 | Active Phase Randomisation | Active phase randomisation involves continuously varying the phase of emitted quantum signals to enhance security, with optimal implementation includ… |
| CM-0030 | Quantum Device Optimal Design and TEMPEST | The optimal design of quantum communication devices, including QKD nodes, optical ground stations, and communication satellites, is crucial to minimi… |
| CM-0034 | Passive Quantum Communication Transmitters | Passive transmitters using a linear optics network and post-selection have no active modulator and might be more robust against side-channel attacks … |
| CM-0037 | Passive Phase Randomisation | Implementing passive phase randomisation in QKD, e.g., by operating lasers in gain-switched mode. |
| CM-0038 | Phase Modulator Triggering | Triggering phase modulators with incoming bright light pulses to enhance QKD system security. |
| CM-0039 | Bit-Mapped Gating | Bit-mapped gating is a countermeasure in QKD systems that randomizes detection mappings to prevent detector-control attacks. It presupposes a gated d… |
| CM-0041 | Laser Pulse-Period Control | Laser pulse-period control sets crucial parameters like the pulse repetition period of the laser to prevent synchronization issues. |
| CM-0043 | Detector with Random Jitter | Per-pulse randomisation of the detector gating-window arrival time, which smears the detectors' efficiency curves and lowers the mismatch a timing at… |
| CM-0046 | Active Polarisation State Scrambling | Active polarization state scrambling enhances QKD receiver security by dynamically altering the polarization states. |
| CM-0047 | Gain Modulation of the Photocurrent | Gain modulation of the photocurrent in APDs thwarts thermal attacks by adjusting response to continuous-wave power levels. |
| CM-0048 | Dead Time Enforcement and Gating Window Discrimination | Enforcing dead time and discriminating gating windows to secure detection timing in QKD systems. |
| CM-0053 | Detector Reset Mechanism (Active or Passive) | Implementing an active reset circuit or a passive shunt resistor to prevent permanent latching of detectors in quantum communication systems [Lyderse… |
| CM-0055 | Single-Mode Fiber Coupling | This countermeasure involves coupling all quantum states into a single-mode optical fibre before their release into the free-space channel. This cont… |
| CM-0056 | Single Laser Diode Utilization | Single Laser Diode Utilization removes the spatial, spectral and temporal differences between separate lasers by employing a single laser diode for s… |
| CM-0057 | Wavelength Randomization | Wavelength randomization has the transmitter (Alice) vary the emission wavelength of its laser diodes at random, within a range it controls, so that … |
| CM-0061 | Detector's Dead Time Management | Many techniques exploit a Single-Photon Detector's (SPD's) dead time. Therefore it is appropriate to manage this detector's period, e.g. by simultane… |
| CM-0062 | Management of Published Information In Classical Channel Communication | This countermeasure focuses on the meticulous handling of timing data and other potentially revealing information that is shared over public channels… |
| CM-0063 | Employment of External Intensity Modulator | Decoy-state QKD needs the transmitter's (Alice's) signal and decoy pulses to be identical in everything except their brightness, because the protocol… |
| CM-0064 | Triple Intensity Modulation for Side Channel Elimination | Triple Intensity Modulation technique in TF-QKD systems addresses frequency side channels by modulating signal and reference pulses. |
| CM-0066 | Use of Verifiable Secret Sharing and Privacy Amplification Techniques | Employing verifiable secret sharing and privacy amplification techniques to bolster security in QKD systems. |
| CM-0070 | Power Analysis Masquerading and Obscuring | A set of changes to a QKD system's classical electronics and post-processing code that hide what the power it draws reveals about the key. The threat… |
| CM-0076 | Tamper Protection | Tamper Protection involves implementing security measures to prevent "classical" unauthorized access and alterations to the physical hardware and rel… |
| CM-0077 | End-to-End Encryption for Classical Channels in Quantum Communication Systems | End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) is a countermeasure for securing the classical communication channels within quantum communication systems, ensuring tha… |
| CM-0086 | Prior Hardware Component Study | Before a quantum key distribution system goes into service, every security-critical hardware component is measured to establish what it actually does… |
| CM-0098 | True Discrete Modulation | The goal is to adopt true discrete modulation instead of approximate Gaussian modulation. The discrete modulation can offer better security assurance… |
| CM-0099 | Variable Optical Attenuator | Variable optical attenuators (VOAs) can adjust the optical power reaching each photodiode, compensating for the differences in quantum efficiencies a… |
| CM-0101 | Effective Photon Lifetime Management | Ensuring that the effective photon lifetime is shorter than the turn-off duration of the laser diode can also help in mitigating phase correlations [… |
| CM-0103 | Advanced Laser Diodes | Employment of advanced laser diodes in the transmitter can help reduce the attack surface for side-channel attacks. This include, e.g. spectral filte… |
| CM-0104 | Initializing Modulation Devices After Each Pulse | Resetting the modulation device after each pulse emission by Alice can minimize pulse correlations and protect the security of QKD systems. |
| CM-0107 | Replacing Intensity Modulators with IQ Modulators | Replacing traditional intensity modulators with IQ modulators can reduce pattern effects due to intensity correlations, particularly in decoy-state Q… |
| CM-0108 | Optimizing DC Bias Conditions | Finding suitable DC bias levels for laser diodes under specific clock speeds can reduce temporal disparities and intensity fluctuations, thereby miti… |
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