| Open Access SQOUTIntercept-and-Resend Attack
The naive intercept-and-resend attack on quantum communication involves a threat actor (Eve) intercepting quantum bits (qubits) being transmitted between two parties, measuring them, and then sending replacement qubits to the receiver. This attack fundamentally compromises the security of quantum communication by attempting to gain information about the key being established between the transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob).
Literature
| [Bennet1992] | C.H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, J. Smolin. "Experimental quantum cryptography" In: J. Cryptology 5, 3–28. (1992) 10.1007/BF00191318. |
| [Curty2005] | Curty, M. and Lütkenhaus, N.. "Intercept-resend attacks in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-distribution protocol with weak coherent pulses" In: Physical Review A, vol. 71, no. 6, 2005. (2005) 10.1103/PhysRevA.71.062301. arXiv:quant-ph/0411041. |
| [Dusek2000] | Dušek, M., Jahma, M., and Lütkenhaus, N.. "Unambiguous state discrimination in quantum cryptography with weak coherent states" In: Physical Review A, vol. 62, no. 2, 2000. (2000) 10.1103/PhysRevA.62.022306. arXiv:quant-ph/9910106. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 3
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Monitoring the error rates in the quantum channel: An increase in error rates beyond a certain threshold indicates the presence of eavesdropping. |
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Privacy amplification can secure the key distribution process even in the presence of some level of eavesdropping. |
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Sending random non-informational qubits along with the actual qubits to detect the presence of an eavesdropper through changes in the statistics of the outcomes. |