| Open Access SQOUT

Manipulation of Vacuum-Noise Estimation

The threat actor (Eve) manipulates the Local Oscillator (LO) parameters to exploit the relationship between vacuum-noise variance and LO power, masking the excess noise from other attacks.

Literature

[Ferenczi2007] A. Ferenczi, P. Grangier, and F. Grosshans. "Calibration Attack and Defense in Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution". In: CLEO/Europe and IQEC 2007 Conference Digest, (Optica Publishing Group, 2007), paper IC_13. (2007) https://opg.optica.org/viewmedia.cfm?uri=IQEC-2007-IC_13&seq=0.
[Haeseler2008] H. Häseler, T. Moroder, and N. L ütkenhaus.. "Testing quantum devices: Practical entanglement verifcation in bipartite optical systems" In: Phys. Rev. A 77, 032303. (2008) 10.1103/PhysRevA.77.032303.
[Huang2014] J. Huang, S. Kunz-Jacques, P. Jouguet, C. Weedbrook, Z. Yin, S. Wang, W. Chen, G. Guo, and Z. Han. "Quantum hacking on quantum key distribution using homodyne detection" In: Phys. Rev. A 89, 032304. (2014) 10.1103/PhysRevA.89.032304.
[Jouguet2013] P. Jouguet, S. Kunz-Jacques, and E. Diamanti. "Preventing calibration attacks on the local oscillator in continuous-variable quantum key distribution" In: Phys. Rev. A 87, 062313. (2013) 10.1103/PhysRevA.87.062313.
[Ma2013a] X. Ma, S. Sun, M. Jiang, and L. Liang. "Local oscillator fuctuation opens a loophole for Eve in practical continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution systems" In: Phys. Rev. A 88, 022339. (2013) 10.1103/PhysRevA.88.022339.
[Zhao2018] Y. Zhao, Y. Zhang, Y. Huang, B. Xu, S. Yu, and H. Guo. "Polarization attack on continuous-variable quantum key distribution" In: J. Phys. B: At. Mol. Opt. Phys. 52, 015501. (2018) 10.1088/1361-6455/aaf0b7.
QID: A-0099
Tier: T0
Type: Quantum
Tactic: Defense Evasion
Created: 2024-06-21
Updated: 2024-08-12

Technique → Countermeasures

List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.

Items: 2
Description Countermeasure

Use real-time quadrature measurement with random optical attenuation.

Use machine learning on pattern recognition.