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Detector Efficiency Mismatch Attack

The Detector Efficiency Mismatch Attack exploits the differential response times and sensitivities of the detectors in a quantum key distribution system. By manipulating the timing of the pulses, the threat actor (Eve) can ensure that only one of the two detectors is active at any given moment, allowing her to control the detection events and thereby gain knowledge of the key material without detection.

Literature

[BSI2023] BSI. "Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems". (2023) https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/QKD-Systems/QKD-Systems.pdf.
[Chaiwongkhot2019] P. Chaiwongkhot, K. Kuntz, Y. Zhang, A. Huang, J. Bourgoin, S. Sajeed, N. ¨utkenhaus, T. Jennewein, and V. Makarov. "Eavesdropper’s ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence" In: Phys. Rev. A 99, 062315. (2018) 10.1103/PhysRevA.99.062315.
[Fatin2021] M. Fatin and S. Sajeed. "Generalized efciency mismatch attack to bypass the detection-scrambling countermeasure" In: Opt. Express 29, 16073-16086. (2021) 10.1364/OE.419338.
[Fei2015] Y. Fei, M. Gao, W. Wang, C. Li, and Z. Ma. "Practical attacks on decoy-state quantum key systems with detector efficiency mismatch" In: Phys. Rev. A 91, 052305. (2015) 10.1103/PhysRevA.91.052305.
[Fei2018a] Y. Fei, X. Meng, M. Gao, Z. Ma, and H. Wang. "Exploiting wavelength-dependent beam splitter to attack the calibration of practical quantum key distribution systems" In: Optik 170, 368–375. (2018) 10.1016/j.ijleo.2018.05.089.
[Jain2011] N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs. "Device Calibration Impacts Security of Quantum Key Distribution" In: Phys. Rev. Lett. 107, 110501. (2011) 10.1103/PhysRevLett.107.110501.
[Jain2014] N. Jain, E. Anisimova, I. Khan, V. Makarov, C. Marquardt, and G. Leuchs. "Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography" In: New J. Phys., vol. 16, no. 12, p. 123030. (2014) 10.1088/1367-2630/16/12/123030.
[Liu2014] Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, C. Kurtsiefer, J. Skaar, V. Makarov, and I. Gerhardt. "A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector" In: Rev. Sci. Instrum. 85, p. 013108. (2014) 10.1063/1.4854615.
[Makarov2005] V. Makarov and D. Hjelme. "Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystem" In: Journal of Modern Optics, 52(5), 691–705. (2005) 10.1080/09500340410001730986.
[Makarov2006] V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar. "Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems" In: Phys. Rev. A 74, 022313. (2006) 10.1103/PhysRevA.74.022313.
[Makarov2008] V. Makarov and J. Skaar. "Faked states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols" In: Quant. Inf. Comp. 8, 0622–0635. (2008) 10.26421/QIC8.6-7-4.
[Qi2007] B. Qi, C. Fung, H. Lo, and X. Ma. "Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems" In: Quant. Inf. Comp. 7, 073–082. (2007) 10.26421/QIC7.1-2-3.
[Rau2015] M. Rau, T. Vogl, G. Corrielli, G. Vest, L. Fuchs, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter. "Spatial Mode Side Channels in Free-Space QKD Implementations" In: IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics 21, 187–191. (2015) 10.1109/JSTQE.2014.2372008.
[Sajeed2015a] S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein, N. Lütkehaus, and V. Makarov. "Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode efficiency mismatch" In: Phys. Rev. A 91, 062301. (2015) 10.1103/PhysRevA.91.062301.
[Silva2015] T. da Silva, G. do Amaral, G. Xavier, G. Temporo, and J. von der Weid. "Safeguarding Quantum Key Distribution Through Detection Randomization" In: IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 159-167. (2015) 10.1109/JSTQE.2014.2361793.
[Wei2019] K. Wei, W. Zhang, Y. Tang, L. You, and F. Xu. "Implementation security of quantum key distribution due to polarization-dependent efficiency mismatch" In: Phys. Rev. A 100, 022325. (2019) 10.1103/PhysRevA.100.022325.
[Zhao2008] Y. Zhao, C. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H. Lo. "Quantum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems" In: Phys. Rev. A 78, 042333. (2008) 10.1103/PhysRevA.78.042333.
QID: A-0069
Tier: T0
Type: Quantum
Tactic: Execution
Created: 2024-04-09
Updated: 2024-05-24

Technique → Countermeasures

List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.

Items: 7
Description Countermeasure

Against the mismatch in temporal DOF - a random shifting of the receiver detection time window

Employ the bit-mapped gating.

Consider MDI-QKD type of protocols.

Against the mismatch in temporal DOF - monitoring of QBER and coincidence statistics [Makarov2008]

Consider this attack in your security proof.

Employ a wavelength filter when exploiting the wavelength components.

Against the polarisation-dependent mismatch - active polarisation state scrambling inside the QKD receiver.