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Phase-Remapping Attack

The Phase-Remapping Attack targets the phase encoding schemes of QKD systems, exploiting vulnerabilities in the phase modulators used for encoding quantum information. This attack manipulates the phase of the quantum states as they travel between the transmitter (Alice) and the receiver (Bob), potentially allowing the threat actor (Eve) to alter or gain knowledge of the quantum key without detection.

Literature

[Chau2002] H. F. Chau. "Practical scheme to share a secret key through a quantum channel with a 27.6% bit error rate" In: Phys. Rev. A 66, 060302(R). (2002) 10.1103/PhysRevA.66.060302.
[Dong2014] Z. Dong, N. Yu, Z. Wei, J. Wang, and Z. Zhang. "An attack aimed at active phase compensation in one-way phase-encoded QKD systems" In: Eur. Phys. J. D 68, p. 230. (2014) 10.1140/epjd/e2014-40693-6.
[Fung2006] C.-H. F. Fung, K. Tamaki, and H.-K. Lo. "Performance of two quantum-key-distribution protocols" In: Phys. Rev. A 73, 012337. (2006) 10.1103/PhysRevA.73.012337.
[Fung2007] C. Fung, B. Qi, K. Tamaki, and H. Lo. "Phase-remapping attack in practical quantum-key-distribution systems" In: Phys. Rev. A 75, p. 032314. (2007) 10.1103/PhysRevA.75.032314.
[Gottesman2004] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lutkenhaus, and J. Preskill. "Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices" In: Quantum Information and Computation Vol.4 No.5. (2004) 10.26421/QIC4.5-1.
[Xu2010] F. Xu, B. Qi, and H. Lo. "Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system" In: New Journal of Physics 12, p. 113026. (2010) 10.1088/1367-2630/12/11/113026.
QID: A-0054
Tier: T0
Type: Quantum
Tactic: Execution
Created: 2024-04-03
Updated: 2024-08-12

Technique → Countermeasures

List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.

Items: 3
Description Countermeasure

State preparation monitoring.

Using watchdog detectors

Alice carefully checks the arrival time of the reference pulse and the signal pulse by monitoring them.