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Laser Seeding Attack on Two-Way Scheme
In the Laser Seeding Attack tailored for two-way quantum key distribution schemes, the threat actor (Eve) manipulates the intensity of the optical pulses within the system by intercepting and replacing the pulses the receiver (Bob) sends to the transmitter (Alice) with ones of higher intensity. This strategic replacement forces Alice to encode her information on these intensified pulses, inadvertently increasing the intensity of the signals she sends back to Bob, compromising the system's security.
Literature
| [BSI2023] | BSI. "Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems". (2023) https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/QKD-Systems/QKD-Systems.pdf. |
| [Sajeed2015] | S. Sajeed, I. Radchenko, S. Kaiser, J. Bourgoin, A. Pappa, L. Monat, M. Legr, and V. Makarov. "Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing" In: Phys. Rev. A 91, 032326. (2015) 10.1103/PhysRevA.91.03232. |
| [Zhao2008a] | Y. Zhao, B. Qi, and H. Lo. "Quantum key distribution with an unknown and un-trusted source" In: Phys. Rev. A 77, 052327. (2008) 10.1103/PhysRevA.77.052327. |
| [Zhao2010] | Y. Zhao, B. Qi, H. Lo, and L. Qian. "Security analysis of an untrusted source for quantum key distribution: passive approach" In: New Journal of Physics 12, 023024.. (2010) 10.1088/1367-2630/12/2/023024. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 3
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Consider this attack in your security proof [Zhao2008a,Zhao2010]. |
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Employment of watchdog monitoring. |
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Employment of spectral filtering [BSI2023] |