Execution

System

The threat actor is trying to run malicious activity.

QID: T-0004
UUID: bb16497a-b92a-42c5-ba47-5a0bf67dd2f6
Tier: T0
Type: Attack
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
Created: 2024-02-28
Updated: 2026-11-14
Techniques 35
QID Title Description
A-0044 Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) Attack The Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) attack targets quantum communication systems that use multi-photon pulses. In this strategy, a threat actor (Eve) e…
A-0045 Intercept-and-Resend Attack The naive intercept-and-resend attack on quantum communication involves a threat actor (Eve) intercepting quantum bits (qubits) being transmitted bet…
A-0049 Quantum Trojan-Horse Attack (THA) In a Quantum Trojan-Horse Attack (THA), a threat actor (Eve) learns the settings of a QKD system by reading light that leaves the apparatus through i…
A-0054 Phase-Remapping Attack The Phase-Remapping Attack targets QKD systems that encode the key in the optical phase, and it exploits the fact that a real phase modulator is impe…
A-0055 Non-Random Phase Attack The Non-Random Phase Attack is a sophisticated strategy targeting decoy-state-based QKD, e.g. BB84, protocols, where it exploits the lack of randomne…
A-0056 Partially-Random-Phase Attack The Partially-Random-Phase Attack targets two-way (plug-and-play) QKD systems, in which the receiver (Bob) sends bright pulses to the transmitter (Al…
A-0057 Frequency-Shift Attack The Frequency-Shift Attack is a sophisticated strategy where the threat actor (Eve) replaces the receiver's (Bob's) optical pulses with time-shifted …
A-0066 Injection-Locking Attack (ILA) In the Injection-Locking Attack (ILA) the threat actor (Eve) sends her own laser light backwards down the quantum channel into the transmitter's (Ali…
A-0067 Wavelength-Selected Photon-Number-Splitting Attack The Wavelength-Selected Photon-Number-Splitting (WSPNS) attack targets quantum key distribution systems using decoy states using a two-way scheme, ex…
A-0068 Double-Click Attack The Double-click attack in quantum key distribution systems exploits simultaneous detection events in both detectors of a chosen basis at the receive…
A-0069 Detector Efficiency Mismatch Attack The Detector Efficiency Mismatch Attack exploits the differential response times and sensitivities of the detectors in a quantum key distribution sys…
A-0070 Blinding Attack with Faked States In the Blinding and Faked States Attack on quantum key distribution systems, the threat actor (Eve) uses tailored bright illumination to manipulate t…
A-0074 Detector Control via After-Gate Pulses Attack The Detector Control via After-Gate Pulses Attack targets the transient operational state of gated Avalanche Photodiodes (APDs) used in DV-QKD system…
A-0075 Detector Control by Exploiting Superlinearity The Detector Control, by Exploiting Superlinearity attack, targets QKD systems by leveraging the unexpected behaviour of single-photon detectors, spe…
A-0076 Blinding Attack Using Dead Time The Blinding Attack Using Dead Time exploits the inherent dead time of Avalanche Photodiodes (APDs) in QKD systems to gain knowledge of the key witho…
A-0077 Blinding Attack on Self-Differencing APDs Self-differencing single-photon detectors cancel the capacitive gating transient by subtracting the avalanche photodiode's output from a copy of itse…
A-0078 Illuminating and Faked States Attack on SNSPDs The threat actor (Eve) takes control of a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) at the receiver (Bob) by shining bright light into …
A-0080 Backflash Attack Avalanche photodiodes emit a faint flash of light every time they register a photon. In a QKD receiver those backflash photons travel back out throug…
A-0081 Spatial Misalignment Exploitation in QKD A free-space transmitter (Alice) that encodes each quantum state with its own laser diode cannot point all of those diodes in exactly the same direct…
A-0082 Wavelength Manipulation Attack in Free-Space The Wavelength Manipulation Attack in free-space Quantum Key Distribution systems involves using an external laser to alter the wavelength of the las…
A-0083 Side Channel Exploitation in Transmitter Imperfections No two laser diodes emit identical light, so a transmitter (Alice) that encodes by switching between several of them stamps its setting onto properti…
A-0084 Passive Faraday Mirror Attack The Passive Faraday Mirror Attack targets phase-encoded QKD systems by exploiting imperfections in Faraday mirrors (FMs), which fail to provide perfe…
A-0085 Dead Time Correlation Attack The Dead Time Correlation Attack lets a threat actor (Eve) read part of a QKD key without touching the quantum channel at all. Every single-photon de…
A-0086 Timing Attack Exploiting Detector Response Times A quantum key distribution receiver uses several single-photon detectors, and which one of them fires is what carries the secret bit. The detectors d…
A-0087 Timing Mismatch Attack on Signal and Decoy States The Timing Mismatch Attack exploits differences in emission timing between signal and decoy states generated by gain-switched laser diodes in QKD sys…
A-0088 Frequency Side Channel Attack in Twin-Field QKD The Frequency Side Channel Attack exploits imperfections in intensity modulation within Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution (TF-QKD) systems, leading…
A-0095 Information Leakage Through Electromagnetic Radiation The threat actor (Eve) measures the electromagnetic radiation emitted by the transmitter (Alice) to infer information about the generated key in a Qu…
A-0096 Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack The threat actor (Eve) exploits the wavelength dependence of the beamsplitter in the receiver's (Bob's) QKD receiver to control measurement results a…
A-0097 Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack on CV-QKD The threat actor (Eve) exploits the wavelength dependence of the beamsplitter in the receiver's (Bob's) Continuous-Variable (CV) QKD receiver to cont…
A-0098 Saturation Attack The threat actor (Eve) resends coherent states with a displaced mean to the CV-QKD receiver (Bob) to saturate the detector, masking the increase of e…
A-0099 Manipulation of Vacuum-Noise Estimation The threat actor (Eve) tampers with the light travelling between the transmitter (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) so that the receiver's own measuremen…
A-0100 Exploiting Imperfect Channel Transmittance in CV-QKD The threat actor (Eve) can exploit an imperfect channel transmittance model in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) systems to overe…
A-0101 Power Consumption Analysis Attack on State Preparation in QKD Systems The threat actor (Eve) infers the quantum states prepared by the transmitter (Alice) by analysing the power consumption of the electrical circuit tha…
A-0102 CV Detector-Control Attack The threat actor (Eve) injects bright light into the signal port of a CV-QKD receiver (Bob) to saturate the detector electronics, masking other attac…
A-0103 Exploiting the Trusted Phase Noise Model in CV-QKD The threat actor (Eve) manipulates the classical signal used for phase-reference alignment in CV-QKD systems, exploiting the trusted phase noise mode…
See Also
T-0002 Resource Development
T-0003 Initial Access
T-0007 Defense Evasion
T-0013 Exfiltration
T-0014 Impact