Execution
System
The threat actor is trying to run malicious activity.
QID:
T-0004
UUID:
bb16497a-b92a-42c5-ba47-5a0bf67dd2f6
Tier:
T0
Type:
Attack
Domain(s):
- Quantum Communication
Created:
2024-02-28
Updated:
2026-11-14
On this page
Techniques
35
| QID | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|
| A-0044 | Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) Attack | The Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) attack targets quantum communication systems that use multi-photon pulses. In this strategy, a threat actor (Eve) e… |
| A-0045 | Intercept-and-Resend Attack | The naive intercept-and-resend attack on quantum communication involves a threat actor (Eve) intercepting quantum bits (qubits) being transmitted bet… |
| A-0049 | Quantum Trojan-Horse Attack (THA) | In a Quantum Trojan-Horse Attack (THA), a threat actor (Eve) learns the settings of a QKD system by reading light that leaves the apparatus through i… |
| A-0054 | Phase-Remapping Attack | The Phase-Remapping Attack targets QKD systems that encode the key in the optical phase, and it exploits the fact that a real phase modulator is impe… |
| A-0055 | Non-Random Phase Attack | The Non-Random Phase Attack is a sophisticated strategy targeting decoy-state-based QKD, e.g. BB84, protocols, where it exploits the lack of randomne… |
| A-0056 | Partially-Random-Phase Attack | The Partially-Random-Phase Attack targets two-way (plug-and-play) QKD systems, in which the receiver (Bob) sends bright pulses to the transmitter (Al… |
| A-0057 | Frequency-Shift Attack | The Frequency-Shift Attack is a sophisticated strategy where the threat actor (Eve) replaces the receiver's (Bob's) optical pulses with time-shifted … |
| A-0066 | Injection-Locking Attack (ILA) | In the Injection-Locking Attack (ILA) the threat actor (Eve) sends her own laser light backwards down the quantum channel into the transmitter's (Ali… |
| A-0067 | Wavelength-Selected Photon-Number-Splitting Attack | The Wavelength-Selected Photon-Number-Splitting (WSPNS) attack targets quantum key distribution systems using decoy states using a two-way scheme, ex… |
| A-0068 | Double-Click Attack | The Double-click attack in quantum key distribution systems exploits simultaneous detection events in both detectors of a chosen basis at the receive… |
| A-0069 | Detector Efficiency Mismatch Attack | The Detector Efficiency Mismatch Attack exploits the differential response times and sensitivities of the detectors in a quantum key distribution sys… |
| A-0070 | Blinding Attack with Faked States | In the Blinding and Faked States Attack on quantum key distribution systems, the threat actor (Eve) uses tailored bright illumination to manipulate t… |
| A-0074 | Detector Control via After-Gate Pulses Attack | The Detector Control via After-Gate Pulses Attack targets the transient operational state of gated Avalanche Photodiodes (APDs) used in DV-QKD system… |
| A-0075 | Detector Control by Exploiting Superlinearity | The Detector Control, by Exploiting Superlinearity attack, targets QKD systems by leveraging the unexpected behaviour of single-photon detectors, spe… |
| A-0076 | Blinding Attack Using Dead Time | The Blinding Attack Using Dead Time exploits the inherent dead time of Avalanche Photodiodes (APDs) in QKD systems to gain knowledge of the key witho… |
| A-0077 | Blinding Attack on Self-Differencing APDs | Self-differencing single-photon detectors cancel the capacitive gating transient by subtracting the avalanche photodiode's output from a copy of itse… |
| A-0078 | Illuminating and Faked States Attack on SNSPDs | The threat actor (Eve) takes control of a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) at the receiver (Bob) by shining bright light into … |
| A-0080 | Backflash Attack | Avalanche photodiodes emit a faint flash of light every time they register a photon. In a QKD receiver those backflash photons travel back out throug… |
| A-0081 | Spatial Misalignment Exploitation in QKD | A free-space transmitter (Alice) that encodes each quantum state with its own laser diode cannot point all of those diodes in exactly the same direct… |
| A-0082 | Wavelength Manipulation Attack in Free-Space | The Wavelength Manipulation Attack in free-space Quantum Key Distribution systems involves using an external laser to alter the wavelength of the las… |
| A-0083 | Side Channel Exploitation in Transmitter Imperfections | No two laser diodes emit identical light, so a transmitter (Alice) that encodes by switching between several of them stamps its setting onto properti… |
| A-0084 | Passive Faraday Mirror Attack | The Passive Faraday Mirror Attack targets phase-encoded QKD systems by exploiting imperfections in Faraday mirrors (FMs), which fail to provide perfe… |
| A-0085 | Dead Time Correlation Attack | The Dead Time Correlation Attack lets a threat actor (Eve) read part of a QKD key without touching the quantum channel at all. Every single-photon de… |
| A-0086 | Timing Attack Exploiting Detector Response Times | A quantum key distribution receiver uses several single-photon detectors, and which one of them fires is what carries the secret bit. The detectors d… |
| A-0087 | Timing Mismatch Attack on Signal and Decoy States | The Timing Mismatch Attack exploits differences in emission timing between signal and decoy states generated by gain-switched laser diodes in QKD sys… |
| A-0088 | Frequency Side Channel Attack in Twin-Field QKD | The Frequency Side Channel Attack exploits imperfections in intensity modulation within Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution (TF-QKD) systems, leading… |
| A-0095 | Information Leakage Through Electromagnetic Radiation | The threat actor (Eve) measures the electromagnetic radiation emitted by the transmitter (Alice) to infer information about the generated key in a Qu… |
| A-0096 | Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack | The threat actor (Eve) exploits the wavelength dependence of the beamsplitter in the receiver's (Bob's) QKD receiver to control measurement results a… |
| A-0097 | Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack on CV-QKD | The threat actor (Eve) exploits the wavelength dependence of the beamsplitter in the receiver's (Bob's) Continuous-Variable (CV) QKD receiver to cont… |
| A-0098 | Saturation Attack | The threat actor (Eve) resends coherent states with a displaced mean to the CV-QKD receiver (Bob) to saturate the detector, masking the increase of e… |
| A-0099 | Manipulation of Vacuum-Noise Estimation | The threat actor (Eve) tampers with the light travelling between the transmitter (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) so that the receiver's own measuremen… |
| A-0100 | Exploiting Imperfect Channel Transmittance in CV-QKD | The threat actor (Eve) can exploit an imperfect channel transmittance model in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) systems to overe… |
| A-0101 | Power Consumption Analysis Attack on State Preparation in QKD Systems | The threat actor (Eve) infers the quantum states prepared by the transmitter (Alice) by analysing the power consumption of the electrical circuit tha… |
| A-0102 | CV Detector-Control Attack | The threat actor (Eve) injects bright light into the signal port of a CV-QKD receiver (Bob) to saturate the detector electronics, masking other attac… |
| A-0103 | Exploiting the Trusted Phase Noise Model in CV-QKD | The threat actor (Eve) manipulates the classical signal used for phase-reference alignment in CV-QKD systems, exploiting the trusted phase noise mode… |
|